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Inflation creates problems for us all, but it is traditional to 
point out that it affects those on fixed incomes most of all. 
For that reason, many public income maintenance programs 
have incorporated inflation adjustments in recent years. 
However, the private workers© compensation system has 
been slow to react, due primarily to the cost impact of index 
ation of benefits. While the lifetime payments to some 
workers© compensation cases make the cost of inflation pro 
tection very high, they also make the need very great for the 
beneficiaries.
The idea of a state fund organized to make inflation ad 
justment payments to workers© compensation beneficiaries 
was raised before the Michigan Workers© Compensation 
Reform Task Force in 1979. Since it was put forward as a 
way to reduce the cost of inflation protection, it seemed wor 
thy of additional study and analysis. This volume represents 
the outcome of that process. Dr. Hunt has simulated the 
operation of such a benefit adjustment fund and examined 
the feasibility of such a program in a world of considerable 
uncertainty.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are 
the sole responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent positions of the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research.
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One of the serious shortcomings of workers© compensa 
tion as an income maintenance system for the long term 
disabled is the lack of protection from inflation. The weekly 
compensation rate in most states is set at two-thirds of the 
weekly wage as of the time of the injury. There is debate 
about the adequacy of this ratio, taking into account such 
factors as the historical maximum at two-thirds of the state 
average weekly wage, the loss of some or all fringe benefits, 
the tax free status of workers© compensation benefits, etc. 
But there is no room for debate on the adequacy of a benefit 
linked to a wage level 10, 20, or 30 years ago.
During inflationary times like the present, the passage of 
just a few years with double-digit inflation can have a 
devastating impact on the standard of living of a disabled 
worker. This concern is reflected in the following statement 
by William Marshall, President of the Michigan AFL-CIO, 
concerning the Michigan workers© compensation system:
Perhaps the most inequitable part of our present law in 
sofar as benefits is concerned, is the lack of a cost-of- 
living provision for injured workers. In this age where 
inflation is a fact of life, our current law fixes benefits 
as of the date of injury and condemns the disabled to an 
erosion of their purchasing power and in the final result 
to welfare. 1
1. LABORegister 3 (June 1979), p. 173.
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But it is not just labor interests that have endorsed the princi 
ple of inflation adjustment for workers© compensation 
beneficiaries.
The National Commission on State Workmen©s Compen 
sation Laws in 1972 recommended benefit adjustment for 
permanent total disability and fatality cases:
We recommend that beneficiaries in permanent total 
disability cases have their benefits increased through 
time in the same proportion as increases in the State©s 
average weekly wage. 2
In May of 1974, a federal interdepartmental study group on 
workers© compensation published a "White Paper on 
Workers© Compensation." This report represented the 
Republican administration©s reaction to the recommenda 
tions of the National Commission on State Workmen©s 
Compensation Laws. It too endorsed the principle of benefit 
adjustment:
Cost of Living Adjustment. Beyond the recommenda 
tions of the National Commission, we are concerned by 
the erosion of the value of workers© compensation 
benefits due to the long-term impact of inflation. 
Benefits which may have been adequate at the time they 
were granted, have, over the years, become seriously in 
adequate.
The States, therefore, should enact an annual cost of 
living adjustment in benefits paid regularly to 
employees© survivors and to persons with long-term 
disabilities. This adjustment should be automatic and 
compensate for changes in the purchasing power of 
benefits. On a prospective basis, this should be im-
2. Recommendation 3.14. See also Recommendation 3.22 (fatalities). The Report of the 
National Commission on State Workmen©s Compensation Laws (Washington, DC: 
USGPO), July 1972, p. 64 and p. 71.
Introduction 3
plemented immediately. The complexity of retroactive 
adjustments for those disabled in the past requires fur 
ther study, including consideration of a gradual phase- 
in of benefit adjustments. 3
More recently, the Policy Group of the Federal In 
terdepartmental Workers© Compensation Task Force, in a 
follow-up to the White Paper, noted: "An annual cost-of- 
living adjustment for benefit levels, as recommended in the 
White Paper, is provided in only fifteen states. These vary 
widely as to the types of benefits adjusted and the formulas 
used in computing the adjustments." 4 Further, this group 
added its weight to the now familiar refrain:
We recommend that long-term wage replacement 
benefits to disabled workers or survivors be increased 
annually in proportion to the increase in the State©s 
average weekly wage, and that the pre-injury wage be 
similarly escalated in all calculations. We urge that State 
insurance regulatory authorities carefully review and 
control proposed trend or projection factors in respect 
to such escalation provisions and that alternative 
methods of funding increments be explored. This 
recommendation would apply to all new cases entering 
the workers© compensation system.
Cases already receiving long-term benefits should also 
be adjusted to current wage levels. It is difficult to know 
how the cost of such payments should be allocated, 
however. States which decide to enact such adjustments, 
may wish to provide part or all of the funding. 5
Lastly, on September 10, 1980, the International Associa 
tion of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions
3. White Paper on Workers© Compensation: A Report on the Need for Reform of State 
Workers© Compensation (Washington, DC: USGPO), May 1974, pp. 4-5.
4. "Workers© Compensation: Is There a Better Way" (Washington, DC: mimeo), January 
19, 1977, p. 21. 
5. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
Introduction
(IAIABC) adopted a new set of standards at their 66th An 
nual Convention. This represents an attempt by these ad 
ministrators of workers© compensation programs in the 
United States and Canada to define the parameters of an 
ideal workers© compensation system. New Standard Number 
Ten endorses the principle of inflation adjustment:
(10) BENEFIT ADJUSTMENTS Compensation 
payable for total disability or survivor benefits should 
be adjusted annually to reflect percentage changes in the 
average weekly wage of the jurisdiction. 6
Thus there would appear to be widespread agreement that in 
flation protection for long term workers© compensation 
beneficiaries is desirable.
While Michigan is one of the states that does provide some 
inflation adjustment, there is still substantial need for infla 
tion protection. Michigan statute specifies that permanently 
and totally disabled claimants shall not receive lesser com 
pensation (in weeks or in amounts per week) than is currently 
provided by law. This amounts to a limited inflation adjust 
ment program, since the benefit is still conditioned by the 
claimant©s wage (so long as the minimum benefit does not 
come into play). But even this limited adjustment is only 
paid to those permanently and totally disabled, which is very 
narrowly defined in Michigan. 7 The result is that a total of 
less than 1,500 of the roughly 25,000 cases in active payment 
status were receiving such inflation adjustment payments as 
of late 1979. This is a start, but it is hardly sufficient to come 
into compliance with the recommendations recited above.
Since there is little or no disagreement with the premise 
that inflation protection for some or all long term workers©
6. Report of the Legislation Committee of the IAIABC, September 8, 1980 (mimeo), p. 7.
7. Under Michigan statute, the totally and permanently disabled are the blind, the in 
curably insane, double amputees, and those who have lost the industrial use of both arms, 
both legs or one of each.
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compensation beneficiaries would be a good thing, the prob 
lem of implementation clearly is the cost. In the words of the 
IAIABC Legislation Committee report:
It is understood there are cost implications to this 
proposal perhaps greater than those which attach to any 
of the other recommendations we make to the Associa 
tion. We understand that the legislative response to such 
recommendations will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic 
tion. The Committee recommends, and believes the 
Association will endorse, the explicit statement of prin 
ciple here that a disabled employee©s wage replacement 
ought to in some manner be assured of retaining its pur 
chasing power. That this might not be an immediately 
attainable goal should not detract from the fact that it is 
a desirable goal. 8
When the subject of inflation protection was considered by 
the Workers© Compensation Reform Task Force in Michigan 
in August of 1979, the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance (NCCI) reported that the addition of inflation ad 
justment would increase benefit costs in Michigan by an 
estimated 41.6 percent, and this was for a plan with a 6 per 
cent annual cap on the adjustment. Even worse, when infla 
tion adjustment was imposed over the anticipated increase in 
the maximum benefit to 100 percent of the state average 
weekly wage, the result would be an estimated 69 percent in 
crease in benefit costs.
It would not be an overstatement to say that these figures 
shocked some of the Task Force members. Further, it made 
a compromise reform package difficult, if not impossible, to 
negotiate. The major business objective was to reduce 
workers© compensation costs, in the future if not immediate 
ly. This translated into specific proposals for coordination of 
workers© compensation with other income maintenance
8. Report of Legislation Committee, p. 7.
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systems, changes in the definition of disability and the 
statute of limitations, new presumptions on retiree claims 
and heart or mental disability claims, and others. But if the 
major labor objectives of increasing the maximum benefit 
and securing inflation protection for all beneficiaries would 
raise costs by 69 percent, there was no chance that both sides 
could secure their objectives.
This paper addresses the issue of the cost of inflation pro 
tection from a different perspective. One of the ideas that 
emerged from the Workers© Compensation Reform Task 
Force discussions in Michigan was to create a state fund for 
the purpose of providing inflation protection for workers© 
compensation beneficiaries. Presumably, the pattern for this 
suggestion was the current program of differential benefit 
payments to Michigan©s permanently and totally disabled 
workers© compensation population mentioned above.
The proposal was that insurers would add inflation sup 
plements, in amounts to be specified by the plan, to regular 
weekly benefit checks as they were distributed through nor 
mal channels. 9 Then, at regular intervals (the Second Injury 
Fund uses six months), the state benefit adjustment fund 
would reimburse the insurers for the total inflation sup 
plements paid. This plan has the advantage of making max 
imum use of current administrative machinery, and 
therefore would entail minimum additional distribution ex 
penses for the workers© compensation system as a whole.
The revenue to make the reimbursement payments could 
plausibly come from a number of sources, but the specific 
proposal was that it should be raised by assessment against 
total indemnity payments by each employer. It could also be 
raised with some kind of earmarked tax, or even from 
general revenues, although in neither case would the addi 
tional benefit costs be internalized in the production cost of
9. The term insurer refers to both insurance carriers and the self-insured.
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the products generating the original injuries one of the 
basic principles of the workers© compensation system. The 
interest earnings of such a state benefit adjustment fund 
would, of course, not be subject to income taxation. 
Therefore, a greater proportion of the revenues collected 
could be translated into benefits for claimants than under a 
similar benefit adjustment plan in the private sector. This 
might be particularly significant for a benefit adjustment 
plan since it will be necessary to accumulate substantial 
reserves against the lifetime payments that will be required to 
protect current beneficiaries from future increases in the cost 
of living.
This paper explores the costs of a state benefit adjustment 
fund for workers© compensation claimants in Michigan. 10 To 
facilitate the process, a new methodology was developed. 
This benefit adjustment model is presented in chapter 2. It 
grew out of the need to organize the factors in the Michigan 
workers© compensation system that would impact on the cost 
of benefit adjustment. It was designed also to utilize the 
specific data available from the Michigan Bureau of 
Workers© Disability Compensation, namely, tabulations of 
active workers© compensation cases by year of injury. Two 
such tabulations were used to estimate marginal case reten 
tion rates and a retention function.
The retention function represents the proportion of cases 
from a given injury year that will still be drawing weekly in 
come maintenance benefits during each year following the 
injury year. Thus it describes the persistence of disability 
cases through time their retention by the workers© compen 
sation system. Unfortunately, the limited experience (only 
since 1965) with lifetime benefits for general disability cases 
in Michigan makes it impossible to observe the tail of the
10. The paper concentrates on prospective benefit adjustment, that is, inflation adjustment 
for future disability cases. The Appendix demonstrates the application of the methodology 
developed here to costing retrospective benefit adjustment plans as well.
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disability duration distribution. Therefore, the retention 
function is estimated partly by extrapolation and assump 
tion. This retention function is specific to Michigan, but it 
should be possible to estimate such a function for any 
workers© compensation system; thus the methodology 
should be adaptable to other states.
The model of benefit adjustment is very simple, once the 
notation is mastered, and it is offered with the expectation 
that it will prove to be intelligible to policymakers. It is 
presented not as a finished product, but for further discus 
sion and development. Hopefully, the discussion will lead to 
improvements that will make the model useful in other ap 
plications.
After the development of the conceptual framework for 
analysis of the benefit adjustment cost problem, chapter 3 
presents a simulation of the operation, under stated assump 
tions, of a benefit adjustment fund for Michigan workers© 
compensation beneficiaries from the 1978 injury cohort. 
These results are termed simulations because of the very 
great level of uncertainty about the number of cases that will 
be eligible for inflation adjustment payments. This is due 
primarily to the deficient empirical base for the retention 
function described earlier. Rather than waiting for years un 
til the actual retention experience is accumulated, it seemed 
preferable to proceed with a representative, hypothetical 
retention function and term the results simulations as oppos 
ed to projections.
The simulation tracks the fund operation over a 50-year 
period, representing the expected lifetime of claimants in 
jured in 1978. The simulation results are presented in tables 
showing the transactions for each year as projected by the 
benefit adjustment model. This does not imply that it is 
possible to foresee these events with any clarity, but rather 
represents an attempt to convey the dynamics of the fund
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operation in a way that the present value of a 50-year stream 
of benefit adjustment payments could never do. Never 
theless, it is the present value of this stream, identified in 
chapter 3 as the forward funding level, which most effective 
ly represents the cost of benefit adjustment.
Chapter 4 probes the sensitivity of this required forward 
funding level to assumptions about future inflation rates and 
the number of cases to be adjusted. Since there is no way to 
accurately forecast these critical parameters, a range of 
possible values is considered. Then their effect on the re 
quired prefunding level of a benefit adjustment fund is deter 
mined. In this way, a plausible range for the necessary fund 
assessment rate is developed despite considerable uncertainty 




This chapter describes the period analysis model underly 
ing the benefit adjustment simulations to be presented later. 
It also discusses the estimation of the "retention function," 
the critical behavioral component of the model. This ap 
proach to costing benefit adjustment plans, both prospective 
and retrospective, is designed to be practical and straightfor 
ward in concept and, hopefully, understandable for a 
nontechnical audience. Some complication is unavoidable 
when dealing with a dynamic process in a period analysis 
where individual cohorts must be kept separate, but it should 
not be an insurmountable obstacle.
Mastery of the model is not required to understand the 
simulation results, but the impatient reader should not skip 
the discussion of the retention function. Understanding the 
way in which the retention function describes the duration of 
workers© compensation cases is vital both to the evaluation 
of the method and to the assessment of the simulation 
results.
This model should also prove to be adaptable to other 
workers© compensation systems, even though it was 
developed with Michigan data for Michigan application. It 
may even be useful for purposes other than costing benefit 
adjustment programs, although it has not yet been used for 
any other purpose. The method developed here is designed to 
make minimal data demands on the workers© compensation
11
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system. To adapt this method to other states would simply 
require estimating the retention function appropriate to the 
jurisdiction. As developed below, this can be done with as 
little as two "snapshots" of the active case population one 
year apart. Of course, the better the description of case dura 
tions contained in the retention function, the better the cost 
estimates the method can produce.
Benefit Adjustment Model
The following represents a model which expresses the rela 
tionship between the factors that determine the cost of a 
benefit adjustment plan. The major complication is in 
representing the time signatures of variables which are 
specific to given time periods. In this discussion, two time 
subscripts will be used. The subscript / will always refer to 
the year of the injury. The subscript./ will refer to any subse 
quent year; it is the year counter for the period analysis. This 
will make it possible to represent present quantities, future 
quantities, and the relationship between them. While the 
notation may be somewhat cumbersome, it can be reduced to 
concepts that have considerable intuitive appeal. Further, 
with specification of the parameters of a benefit adjustment 
plan, it will serve as a vehicle for costing such a plan.
Let:
Aj = number of cases from injury year i that receive 
weekly compensation benefits;
cij = average weekly compensation rate in year j for 
cases from injury year i;
djj = average duration (in weeks) of weekly compen 
sation payments during year j for cases from in 
jury year i;
Pij = proportion of cases from injury year i that are 
drawing weekly compensation benefits in year j.
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Then the number of cases from injury year i that are 
receiving weekly compensation in subsequent year j is Ajpij, 
or the product of the number of weekly compensation cases 
originating in year i and the proportion of these cases that 
will still be active in year j. 1 Further, the total weekly com 
pensation paid to cases from injury year i in subsequent year 
j can be represented as:
The first product is the number of cases from injury year i 
that will be active in year j and the second is the average total 
compensation paid in year j to each of these cases. But note 
that Cjj would constitute the base compensation to injury 
cohort i in year j which would be supplemented by a benefit 
adjustment plan. Thus, it is one of the major variables deter 
mining the cost of such a plan.
Since Aj does not vary with the passage of time, Qj varies 
with pjj, qj and djj. But the average duration of compensa 
tion payments in year j to cases from injury year i (djj) will 
be basically constant beginning a few years after the injury 
year. The active case population (those receiving weekly 
payments) will decline through closures until it reaches the 
point where it includes only the long term disabled, then the 
dy should approach an average duration of 52 weeks in each 
succeeding year. 2
1. There is one problem that is concealed by this notation, the fact that at the end of year i 
all compensable cases with year i injury dates have not yet been identified. This reflects 
litigation over compensability and late reporting as well as delayed onset of disability. In 
the empirical simulations to follow, this will be handled by estimating the retention func 
tion (p^) so as to allow for the addition of these cases. Thus, Aj can be treated as invariant 
with respect to j.
2. Actually, it would never quite reach an average duration of 52 weeks due to the con 
tinued closure of cases. If the closures were spread randomly throughout the year, then the 
average compensation duration during year j for cases that closed during year j would be 
about 26 weeks. The average duration during year j for the cases that remain active would 
of course be 52 weeks. The djj would clearly fall between these subgroup averages, the exact 
value depending on the proportion of cases that are closed during the year.
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Furthermore, in Michigan at least, the average weekly 
compensation rate (cy) for a given injury cohort does not ap 
pear to vary much with j either. It would not be a surprise if 
the average weekly compensation rate for cases from a given 
injury year declined through time as the permanent partial 
disabilities become relatively more important in the distribu 
tion of active cases. This would result from the closure of 
temporary total disability cases with higher compensation 
rates. In Michigan, even though there is no distinction made 
between temporary and permanent disabilities, the process 
should work similarly. However, the existence of the 
redemption (compromise and release) possibility in Michigan 
appears to mitigate this tendency. 3 If most permanent par 
tial disability claims are in fact settled by redemption, it is 
very likely that these claims would never receive any weekly 
indemnity payments at all. Thus they do not count in the 
average weekly compensation rate, and this potential in 
fluence on cy with the passage of time is also negated.
Therefore, the base compensation (Cy) for injury cohort i 
in year j is revealed to depend primarily on the py values, or 
the proportion of cases remaining in active payment status in 
future years. The relationship of the proportion of cases 
from a given injury year remaining active in future years is 
by far the most critical one in the model. This "retention 
function" will be examined in some detail later. Suffice it to 
say at this point that it is the model©s representation of the 
behavior of both claimants and insurers in the workers© com 
pensation system. It is also a major determinant of the costs 
of benefit adjustment.
This can be seen if we let:
fjj = benefit adjustment factor in year j 
for cases from injury year i.
3. A compromise and release agreement is referred to as a "redemption of liability" in 
Michigan. It ends the insurer©s liability for the injuries named as emanating from the acci 
dent or illness, absent fraud or mutual mistake of fact.
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Then the year j cost of supplementing cases from injury year 
i, according to the benefit adjustment plan that provided the 
fjj, would be:
fijCij = fij(Aipij) (cijdij)
In other words, the annual cost of adjustment would be the 
product of the adjustment factor and the base compensation 
paid to injury cohort i in year j, which in turn depends large 
ly on the retention function. While the adjustment factor 
might be subject to some degree of policy control, at least 
before the plan was implemented, the retention function will 
not. Thus the major burden of predicting the cost of a 
benefit adjustment plan will lie in accurately forecasting the 
values of Qj, and the retention function which underlies 
those values.
The actual benefit adjustment factors would depend on 
the plan adopted, and also on future economic 
developments. The plan would specify some adjustment 
mechanism to help maintain the purchasing power of those 
claimants whose disabilities continue into future years. 
Presumably, it would be based either on changes in the state 
average weekly wage or the Consumer Price Index. It might 
be fully indexed to these changes, or only partially; there 
might be an annual cap, or perhaps a lifetime cap, on the ad 
justment factor. There might be a waiting period or some 
other qualification required before adjustment could begin. 
These factors would need to be spelled out in any plan 
adopted. The impact of alternative specification of benefit 
adjustment plan parameters will be discussed in chapters 4 
and 5.
The last development of the adjustment cost model is to 
sum across the years. All discussion to this point has involv 
ed reference to one injury cohort (injury year i) at one point 
in time (year j). It is possible to sum across i to obtain total
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benefit adjustment costs in year j for all injury cohorts: 
Sj-.S /ijCij = .Z fij (AiPij) (qjdij)
1 ~~ Jl 1 ——— 1
Assuming the plan starts in year i = 1 , this summation would 
yield the total cost in year j of adjusting all earlier injury 
cohorts according to the plan©s adjustment factors (fij) 
specific to each cohort in year j. In other words, Sj would be 
the cost in year j of adjusting all existing cases.
Similarly, one could sum across j to get the lifetime benefit 
adjustment costs (where year v is the last adjustment year) 
for injury cohort i.
Si = . 2 . fij Qj = . 2 .fij (AiPij) (qjdij)
In the simulations to be presented later, this is exactly the 
method that is employed to estimate the lifetime adjustment 
costs for a single injury cohort with v set at year 50. For each 
year following the injury year, benefit adjustment costs are 
calculated as the product of the adjustment factor (fy) and 
the base compensation paid to injury cohort i in year j (Cy). 
This base compensation is in turn the product of the number 
of cases from injury year i that are still active in year j and 
the year j compensation paid to the average case from year i.
The quantity Sj represents the future value of payments 
that must be provided to fully fund a benefit adjustment 
plan for injury cohort i. The present value of Sj:
-PV(Sj)= 2 fi
where r represents the rate of discount, is the amount of 
money that is needed in year i to prefund v-i years of benefit 
adjustment payments for injury cohort i. If Sj is to be paid 
from a benefit adjustment fund raised by leveling an assess-
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ment against total indemnity payments in year i, the present 
value of Sj is the amount that must be raised. Thus it 
represents the solution to the simulation exercises. When ex 
pressed as a proportion of total indemnity payments in year 
i, it will yield the assessment rate.
Before going on to the fund simulation where we will 
operationalize this model, let us examine in more depth the 
behavioral content of the model, namely, the retention func 
tion.
Retention Function
One of the most critical elements for estimating the cost of 
benefit adjustment payments in the future is the number of 
cases that will qualify for adjustment. We have just seen that 
the future cost of inflation is the product of the adjustment 
factors and the number of cases that qualify for adjustment. 
Later we will see how the costs of adjustment vary with both 
these factors in the sensitivity analysis of chapter 4. In the 
method employed here, the retention function specifies how 
many cases will remain "active" from a particular injury 
cohort at each year in the future. Thus it will provide the 
number of cases to be adjusted, one of the two critical future 
quantities determining the cost of benefit adjustment.
But even more interesting in a methodological sense is the 
fact that the retention function summarizes the operation of 
the workers© compensation system by tracking the duration 
of disability cases from a given injury year. In this way, the 
behavior of claimants, insurers, and even the administrative 
agency is incorporated into the model. We do not maintain 
that the simple persistence of disability claims through time 
is an adequate description of a workers© compensation 
system for most purposes, but it is clear that it is the most 
important characteristic for costing an inflation adjustment 
plan. Unfortunately, the information required to confidently
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predict the number of cases that will qualify for adjustment 
in future years is not available. First, data on duration of 
workers© compensation cases are very sparse, and second, it 
is impossible to make an adequate prediction of behavioral 
response to an altered system. Thus, even if we had all the 
data we could hope for on the current system, it would still 
be necessary to predict the response to a new system.
The data that the Michigan Bureau of Workers© Disability 
Compensation does have available that can be brought to 
bear on the problem of estimating the retention function for 
workers© compensation cases are shown in table 1. This table 
reports the number of "active" cases, cases receiving weekly 
income maintenance payments, as of December 31, 1977 and 
December 31, 1978. With two observations of the active case 
population one year apart, it is possible to estimate the 
marginal retention rates at various points on the retention 
function. In fact, it is possible to estimate each passing year 
as a separate step on the retention function.
It is important to make clear that "active" status in 
Michigan is independent of litigation status. The case may 
have been litigated before entering active status; it may be 
litigated during or following active status; or, of course, it 
may never be litigated at all, as is true for the majority of 
claims. A case is not "active" by the definition used here un 
til and unless weekly indemnity payments have commenced. 
It is not unusual in Michigan for a case to be compensated 
and closed without even having been active. This is due to 
the use of redemption (compromise and release) settlements. 
If a lump-sum payment is made but no indemnity payments 
were issued on a weekly basis, the case was never active. This 
definition is appropriate so long as the benefit adjustment 
program will confine its attention to cases receiving long 
term weekly payments only. Even under these circumstances, 
however, it will be shown that the redeemed cases will have 
an important bearing on the economics of a benefit adjust-
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ment plan, with potential impact on both the cost and 
revenue dimensions.
The Bureau of Workers© Disability Compensation requires 
that all cases active as of the end of each calendar year must 
be reported on Form 103, "Annual Report on Payment of 
Compensation," by January 31 of the following year. 
Special tabulations of the December 31, 1977 reports and the 
December 31, 1978 reports are the data source for table 1. 
There is some question about the accuracy of these reports, 
as the Bureau suspects that up to 15 percent of cases active at 
the end of a typical year may not be reported on Form 103. 4 
However, it seems likely that the nonreporting would be con 
centrated most heavily among recent cases, especially those 
of short duration which just happened to be in the system on 
the reporting date.
About one-third of the 24,196 cases reported active at the 
end of 1978 showed injury dates in calendar year 1978. Prob 
ably a much higher proportion of unreported cases would be 
1978 origin cases. If this is true, it will introduce a conser 
vative bias into the estimation of marginal retention rates, 
causing an overestimate of the number of cases to be ad 
justed in the future. Nevertheless, the point is that there may 
be an unspecified measurement error present. Using two 
separate active population measurements and basing the 
estimates on the comparison between the two will tend to 
minimize the distortion introduced provided the error is ran 
dom.
Table 1 shows the active case population by injury year at 
the end of 1977 and 1978. The last column of the table shows 
the retention rate that is implied by the change from 1977 to 
1978 in the active case population for each injury cohort. 
The complement of this number would, of course, be the
4. Unfortunately, there has been no investigation of this question for some years due to 
budget deficiencies at the Bureau of Workers© Disability Compensation.
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"closure rate." There is a good deal of variation in the in 
dividual year retention rates. This is no doubt due in part to 
the stochastic element introduced by the measurement error 
just discussed, but it also reflects the fundamental dynamics 
of the active case population.
Table 1

































































SOURCE: Bureau of Workers© Disability Compensation.
For a given injury cohort, comparing the number of cases 
active on December 31,1978 to the number of cases active on 
December 31, 1977 gives a direct estimate of the retention 
rate at this point on the retention function. But this will ac 
tually slightly overstate the retention rate, since cases can 
reenter active status after having been closed. For example, 
between the end of 1977 and the end of 1978 the number of 
active cases with date of injury in 1974 declined from 1,970 
to 1,830. Dividing 1,830 by 1,970 indicates a retention rate of
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.929. But this assumes that only the 1,970 cases from 1974 
active as of December 31, 1977 could potentially have been 
active one year later. In fact, the 1,830 active cases from the 
1974 injury cohort as of December 31, 1978 no doubt include 
some cases that were not active one year earlier. The case 
may have been closed previously but weekly payments were 
resumed during 1978, or it may be that the disability 
resulting from a 1974 injury has only recently emerged and a 
new claim has just been entered.
One or both of these factors presumably accounts for the 
fact that the 1970 injury cohort is reported to have grown 
between the end of 1977 and 1978. Table 1 shows that there 
were 1,062 injury cases from 1970 active at the end of 1977, 
but 1,068 active one year later. This could reflect an influx of 
cases with 1970 injury dates that is greater than the number 
of 1970 cases closed during the year. It could also reflect 
measurement error that resulted in undercounting the 1970 
cohort in 1977. With all these qualifications and reservations 
in mind, let us proceed to use the data of table 1 to estimate 
the retention function for workers© compensation cases in 
Michigan.
From the 1977 injury year cohort, there were 6,953 cases 
active at the end of 1977, but only 2,805 active at the end of 
1978. Thus nearly 60 percent (net) of the 1977 cases had clos 
ed during 1978; 40 percent were retained by the system. The 
problem is that these numbers are somewhat difficult to in 
terpret. Note that among the 6,953 cases from 1977 active at 
the end of 1977 there will be a complex mixture of durations 
of disability. Specific dates of injury could range from 
January 1, 1977 to December 23, 1977 (due to the one-week 
waiting period). Expected future duration of disability 
presumably would vary from one day to a lifetime.
Notice also that included among these 6,953 cases will be 
what are typically known as temporary partial, temporary
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total, permanent partial, and permanent total disabilities, as 
well as fatality cases. While this approach may seem peculiar 
to some, Michigan law does not distinguish between tem 
porary and permanent disabilities (except for a restrictive 
statutory definition of total and permanent disability). Thus 
representing disability claims only through their durations is 
not so strange in Michigan. In fact, it sometimes seems ar 
tificial to try to fit Michigan cases into the conventional 
disability categories.
It follows from the mixture of cases active at any point in 
time that there can be a number of reasons why a case might 
close. First, the claimant may recover and return to work. 
Second, the statutory term of benefits may elapse (for a 
scheduled loss or a fatality). Third, the case may be closed 
through a redemption settlement (although most redemp 
tions are not on a weekly payment at the time of settlement). 
Fourth, in the case of a partial disability, the claimant©s 
earnings in his or her alternative employment may rise to 
equal the previous earnings, thus "eliminating" the wage 
loss that occasions the weekly compensation payments. 
Fifth, the claimant may die from causes other than the work- 
related injury or disease that produced the disability. 5 Clear 
ly, the incidence of each of these and the balance among 
them are related to the elapsed time since the date of the in 
jury.
Whatever the reasons, it appears that 60 percent of the 
1977 injury cases that were active at the end of 1977 were 
closed by the end of 1978. Thus the estimated net marginal 
retention rate is .40 between the end of the injury year and 
the end of the following year; this is the first step in the 
estimated retention function. To derive the second step it is 
necessary to address the 1976 injury cohort. At the end of
5. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Obviously, there are a great many other reasons 
which might bring weekly payments to a conclusion. But these would seem to cover the ma 
jor possibilities.
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1977 there were 2,452 cases from 1976 in active status. One 
year later there were 2,077; thus, 15 percent were closed, 85 
percent retained. The second marginal step on the estimated 
retention function is .85. We can thus proceed to estimate 
the net marginal retention rate for each year subsequent to 
the injury year. Then we can use this chronological step 
function to represent the persistence of disability cases from 
any injury cohort into the future.
Assuming the 1976 injury cohort experience is represen 
tative, it is predicted that 85 percent of the 2,805 cases from 
1977 active at the end of 1978 will still be active at the end of 
1979. Further, it is predicted that 2,592 injury cases from 
1978 will be active at the end of 1980 (7,624 x .40 x .85). The 
data in table 1 enable one to estimate marginal retention 
rates back 13 years to the 1965 injury cohort, the first one 
eligible for lifetime benefits regardless of disability level.
While this is rather sketchy evidence upon which to build 
the central element of the inflation adjustment fund simula 
tion, it is also the best information available at the present 
time. Of course it would be desirable to have more observa 
tions to minimize the impact of reporting errors and other 
random events. Both earlier cohorts and additional snap 
shots would be helpful in increasing confidence that the 
retention function adequately represents the case dynamics. 
Nevertheless, from the data in table 1 and some heroic 
assumptions, one can construct a hypothetical retention 
function to represent the persistence, or retention, of cases 
through the 50 years following the injury.
During the first year following the injury year, 40 percent 
of cases active at the end of the injury year are retained. Dur 
ing each of the next two years, 85 percent of the cases active 
at the beginning of the year are retained. During the fourth 
and fifth years following the injury, 92 percent are retained. 
Thereafter, 96 percent of cases active at the beginning of the
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year are retained through the end of the year. Twenty years 
after the injury year, it is hypothesized that the retention rate 
declines again to 92 percent as old age begins to overtake a 
larger portion of the injured workers. 6
Figure 1 shows the result of applying this hypothetical 
retention function to the 1978 injury cohort and projecting 
the number of 1978 cases that will be active at the end of 
each of the next 50 years. Since the retention function is 
derived from current experience for the first decade follow 
ing the injury, it is impossible to know how accurate it will 
be. In fact, it should be regarded as hypothetical rather than 
possessing any definitive behavioral content. It is a tool to 
help simulate the way the system is currently operating, not a 
separate prediction of the future. In particular, it does not 
predict any change in behavior as a result of the imposition 
of benefit adjustment payments or any other change in the 
workers© compensation system.
Table 2 shows that 80 percent of the 1978 year-end active 
cases will have closed by the end of 1988, 90 percent by the 
end of 2002. But these figures represent the relationship to 
the number of 1978 injury cases still active on December 31, 
1978, not the entire 1978 injury cohort. In fact, the Bureau 
of Workers© Disability Compensation reported 68,516 
workers© compensation claims voluntarily paid (i.e., not 
contested) in 1978. So only about one case in nine from the 
1978 cohort was actually open at the end of 1978. Thus, the 
1,521 active cases from the 1978 cohort predicted for 1988 
would constitute about 2.2 percent of the original cohort. 7 
The prediction of the retention function, therefore, is that
6. For the male population, the death rate at age 65 is about 4 percent per year. It could be 
anticipated that this would significantly understate the death rate among those who had 
been disabled for 20 years. In addition, there would still be closures from other causes as 
well.
7. It is very difficult to get more accurate measurements of particular injury cohorts 
because the Bureau does not keep separate track of the injury year, but simply counts the 
number of cases processed in the calendar year.
Figure 1










































just over 2 percent of the 1978 injury cases will be active 10 
years later. After 20 years all but about 1.5 percent, and after 
30 years all but about 0.6 percent of the 1978 cohort will be 
closed.
Table 2
















































































































As one very rough test of the representativeness of this 
retention function, we can reverse the procedure used in its 
construction. Instead of looking at the number of active 
cases at one point in time, we could try to predict the number 
of cases that would be active using the retention function and 
what information is available on the number of cases 
originating in each past year. Then we can compare the 
predicted number of active cases at a point in time with one 
of the actual measurements of active cases.
Table 3 presents the results of just such an exercise. Begin 
ning with the proportion that active cases at the end of 1978 
were to cases voluntarily paid in 1978 (7,624 to 68,516 or 
.1113), this proportion is then reduced step by step in accor 
dance with the retention function developed earlier. This 
estimated net retention rate is shown in the third column of 
table 3. It is then multiplied by the number of cases volun 
tarily paid in each year back to 1969 to arrive at the predicted 
number of cases active at the end of 1978. 8
It is not strictly correct that only voluntarily paid cases 
would be potential future actives, of course. There would be 
some litigated cases from each injury year that would enter 
active payment status at a later date. However, data are not 
available on these cases, so the voluntary payment cases were 
used as the base. This creates no distortion since the estima 
tion of the retention function originally utilized all active 
cases regardless of origin, thus the effect of "new" cases 
from previous injury years is already included in the reten 
tion function.
Generally speaking, the retention function appears to 
predict the active case population fairly well. The last col 
umn of table 3 indicates that the ratio of predicted active
8. Data are not available on the same reporting basis before 1969. In any event, data before 
September 1965 would not be relevant since this was when limitation of benefits was lifted 
for general disability cases.
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cases to measured active cases varies about unity with no 
discernible trend, at least in the early years. The upward 
swing in 1970 and 1969 in the ratio of predicted to actual 
may indicate that the retention function is not "closing" 
cases as rapidly as in actual practice. It is difficult to tell 
without data for earlier years, but this could mean that we 
are significantly overestimating the number of active cases as 
we approach the long run. This would have the effect of 
making prospective benefit adjustment plans appear to be 
more expensive than they truly are.
Table 3











































































a. Figures provided by the Bureau of Workers© Disability Compensation.
This retention function predicts 15.2 years average dura 
tion of disability payments for cases that are still active two 
years after injury, i.e., that become eligible for adjustment 
payments in the plans with a two-year waiting period to be 
presented later. But the inverse of the duration would be the 
average annual closure probability. If the case population is 
characterized by an average duration of 15.2 years, then one
Methodology 29
would expect about 6.6 percent (1/15.2= .0658) of the case 
population to close each year.
This assumes that the active case population from each in 
jury cohort declines regularly through time, i.e., the reten 
tion function is a "well-behaved" function. But if the 
closure rate is 6.6 percent, the average retention rate would 
be 93.4 percent. So among cases that will show at least two 
years of disability payments, the year-to-year retention rate 
characterizing the population as a whole would be about 93 
percent.
While it is not perfectly compatible, this figure can be 
compared to the experience of the Second Injury Fund in 
Michigan with the statutory permanent and total disability 
claimant population. 9 Michigan statute provides:
Any permanently and totally disabled person as 
defined in this act, . . . who, on and after June 25, 
1955, is entitled to receive payments of workmen©s com 
pensation in amounts per week of less than is presently 
provided in the workmen©s compensation schedule of 
benefits for permanent and total disability, and for a 
lesser number of weeks than the duration of such per 
manent and total disability, . . . shall receive weekly 
from the carrier on behalf of the second injury fund dif-
9. There is a restricted use of the term permanent total disability in Michigan which should 
be distinguished from ordinary usage. The statute provides the following definition (Sec 
tion 361(2)):
Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 351 
means:
(a) Total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes.
(b) Loss of both legs or both feet at or above the ankle.
(c) Loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrist.
(d) Loss of any 2 of the members or faculties enumerated in (a), (b) or (c).
(e) Permanent and complete paralysis of both legs or both arms or of 1 leg and 1 arm. 
(0 Incurable insanity or imbecility.
(g) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 
1 leg and 1 arm.
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ferential benefits equal to the difference between what 
he is now or shall hereafter be entitled to receive from 
his employer under the provisions of this act as the same 
was in effect at the time of his injury, and the amounts 
now provided for his permanent and total disability by 
this or any other amendatory act, with appropriate ap 
plication of the provisions of sections 351 to 359. (Sec 
tion 521(2))
Since maximum and minimum rates are adjusted 
automatically every year to reflect changes in the state 
average weekly wage, this amounts to a benefit adjustment 
plan for a subset of the permanent and total disability
cases. 10
By comparing the number of permanent total disability 
cases being paid differential benefits at the end of each year 
with the equivalent number from last year plus the number 
of new cases acquired during the year, it is possible to 
measure the number of terminations during the year. Then 
the gross retention rate is simply one minus the termination 
rate. Table 4 presents these calculations for the differential 
benefit cases in Michigan. There is some variation in this 
case population with court decisions from time to time, 
which introduces a certain amount of "noise" into the data. 
But table 4 indicates annual gross retention rates for the per 
manent and total disability population varying from .87 to 
.98. The average gross retention rate for the years shown in 
table 4 is .93.
10. It is a subset because not every permanent and total disability case receives differential 
benefits. Suppose a claimant is receiving the maximum compensation rate, and therefore is 
receiving less than two-thirds of gross earnings. As the maximums rise, this individual©s 
benefit will rise also, until the two-thirds replacement level is reached. Then the benefit will 
stop escalating because it reaches the compensation rate due under current law, with 
previous earnings. This claimant will not experience any further adjustment until the com 
pensation rate is overtaken by the minimums.
Table 4
Second Injury Fund Experience
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SOURCE: Funds Administration Annual Report, LABORegister (June 1979), pp. 164-168.
a. Implicit terminations for year t are calculated by adding cases being paid at the end of year t-1 to acquisitions during year t and subtracting
cases being paid at the end of year t.




It would be unwise to make too much of the identity of 
this figure with that derived from the hypothetical retention 
function developed earlier. It is not possible to specify exact 
ly how the population of cases active for more than two 
years would relate to the permanent and total disability 
population, much less a subset of that population. But clear 
ly, the former would be inclusive of the latter. Further, if the 
permanent and total disability cases are expected to be the 
longest duration of any disability category, the probability 
of their closure should be lowest. Thus a procedure which 
estimates the closure probability of the general case popula 
tion with more than two years© disability as similar to the ac 
tual closure experience of the permanent and total disability 
population would seem to be rather conservative. In addi 
tion, it is difficult to avoid noticing that there are only about 
200 new permanent and total disability cases certified each 
year, while the retention function predictions of table 2 
showed 10 times that number of active cases 5 years after the 
injury year.
In the absence of better information, we will use the reten 
tion function derived here to represent the persistence of the 
disability population in Michigan. It seems likely that it 
shows many more long duration cases than will actually be 
experienced, but perhaps that is just as well. Conservative 
estimation of the retention function is an important 
safeguard that may turn out to have anticipated the 
behavioral response to the introduction of benefit adjust 
ment.
With this description of the underlying relationships in 
place, and bearing in mind the limitations of the data base 
with which we are working, let us proceed to examine the 
operation of a benefit adjustment fund for workers© com 




In this chapter we will first discuss the basis for adjust 
ment of workers© compensation benefits. Alternative goals 
of maintaining purchasing power, maintaining relative stan 
dards of living, or maintaining alternative earnings levels will 
be considered. Then the simulated operation of a benefit ad 
justment fund charged with adjusting benefits for one 
workers© compensation injury cohort over a 50-year period 
will be examined in some detail. This analysis will yield an 
estimated forward funding level required to prefund lifetime 
benefit adjustment payments for one injury cohort. A 
discussion of the consequences of overfunding or under- 
funding such a plan and a brief evaluation of the cost 
estimate will follow the presentation of the single cohort 
simulation results. After a full exposition of single cohort 
results, the operation of the full fund, responsible for adjust 
ment of all injury cohorts, is considered.
Basis for Adjustment
Before turning to the simulated operation of a benefit ad 
justment fund, a short discussion of the basis for adjustment 
is in order. The most important question is simply, "What 
are we trying to do?" There are at least three conceptions of
33
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the goal of benefit adjustment. 1 The simplest objective (and 
least expensive under historical conditions) is to maintain the 
purchasing power of the workers© compensation benefit 
received by the disabled worker. Putting aside the question 
of whether the weekly income maintenance benefit is ade 
quate to begin with, we could at least endeavor to keep it 
constant in real terms, to prevent any inflation induced 
degradation in the injured worker©s economic situation. 
There is some dispute as to how adequately the present U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics "market basket" approach to 
measuring changes in the cost of living represents the actual 
price changes as they affect particular individuals, especially 
the retired or disabled. But the principle of benefit adjust 
ment according to a price index is well understood and 
should present no special problems of implementation. 
Thus, if the goal of benefit adjustment is to protect the pur 
chasing power of the workers© compensation benefit, we 
could simply index it to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
On the other hand, the objective of benefit adjustment 
may be to maintain parity of living standards between the in 
jured worker and his or her more fortunate nondisabled col 
leagues. This would imply the use of a wage index to adjust 
workers© compensation income maintenance benefits. Under 
"normal" circumstances, wages tend to rise more rapidly 
than prices, on the average, thus providing a rising real stan 
dard of living. Under such circumstances, many have argued 
that it is unfair to deny the disabled worker an opportunity 
to share in these gains.
In the face of a generally improving standard of living, the 
individual or family held to the same absolute consumption 
levels by a price index adjustment will experience a sense of 
loss relative to their more fortunate friends and neighbors. It
1. See Robert J. Myers, Indexation of Pension and Other Benefits (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 
1978), Ch. HI for a more thorough discussion of indexation options and their implications.
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might also be pointed out that this loss would be imposed on 
top of the original loss occasioned by the fractional wage 
replacement paid in workers© compensation (usually two- 
thirds, less for a high wage worker). Yet, in the past few 
years, prices have tended to rise more rapidly than wages, 
providing the average worker with a declining standard of 
living. Under these circumstances, a disabled worker whose 
compensation was indexed to the CPI would do better than 
his working colleagues.
The third possible objective for benefit adjustment would 
be to attempt to replace the disabled worker©s alternative 
earnings what would have been received had he or she not 
been injured. This plan would have to take account of the in 
jured individual©s occupation, age, education and other cir 
cumstances and then predict what earnings would have been 
achieved in the absence of the injury in order to measure the 
wage loss. While this approach is the most hypothetical, it 
could possibly be implemented with adequate age-earnings 
profiles for different groups. It is probably an open question 
whether this would create more equity issues than it would 
resolve, however.
There are other possible approaches of course, but these 
would seem to be the leading contenders for a benefit adjust 
ment scheme. Realistically, given the complexities of the 
alternative earnings approach, the choice comes down to a 
price index or a wage index as the basis for benefit adjust 
ment. Table 5 shows the trends in the Michigan state average 
weekly wage (SAWW) and the Detroit CPI since 1950. 2 
While the past is not necessarily a reliable guide to the 
future, these figures do show the familiar pattern of annual 
wage increases in excess of price increases except in highly in 
flationary or recessionary times.
2. Actually, the Detroit CPI is not available before 1960, so the changes in the U.S. CPI 
were spliced into the Detroit series to reach back to 1950.




























































































































































SOURCES: Michigan Bureau of Workers© Disability Compensation (SAWW) and 
Michigan Statistical Abstract, 14th Edition, 1979 (CPI).
Over the period of 28 years, the annual compound rate of 
increase in the state average weekly wage was 4.9 percent; for 
the Detroit CPI, 3.6 percent. For the decade from 1968 to 
1978, however, the SAWW increased by 6.6 percent per year 
while the Detroit CPI increased at 6.4 percent annually. If 
we have entered an era marked by no significant growth in
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real earnings as some have suggested, it makes little dif 
ference whether we choose to adjust benefits by a price index 
or a wage index since the gap between the disabled and non- 
disabled will not widen through time anyway.
On the other hand, if we return to more normal conditions 
(by historical standards), then the decision on the basis for 
benefit adjustment may turn out to be quite important. We 
shall see in chapter 4 that the magnitude of the annual 
benefit adjustment factor is a critical determinant of the cost 
of a benefit adjustment program.
Clearly, a political judgment will have to be made between 
a wage or price index before a benefit adjustment program 
can be implemented. For the purposes of the simulated fund 
operation to be presented here, however, we can ignore the 
technical basis for adjustment and simply work with an 
assumed annual adjustment factor. The standard simulation 
assumes a 5 percent annual adjustment factor, although the 
sensitivity analysis in chapter 4 examines a range of 4 to 8 
percent. The 5 percent plan is treated as the standard of com 
parison throughout the paper, however, and it is discussed in 
considerably more detail. While a 5 percent inflation factor 
sounds low at the present time, it is not unrealistic by 
historical standards. Let us proceed then to examine the 
simulated operation of a benefit adjustment fund for 
workers© compensation claimants in Michigan.
Single Cohort Fund Operation
Given the discussions in Michigan to date, it seems likely 
that a benefit adjustment fund would operate much the way 
the Second Injury Fund does currently. There would be an 
assessment made against the indemnity payments in the in 
jury year, or base year, with the assessment rate specified by 
statute or administratively determined by the Bureau. It is 
assumed here that all benefit adjustment costs are to be for-
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ward funded, that is, a sufficient amount of money is to be 
collected through the assessment to fund lifetime benefits for 
all disability cases originating in the base year. 3 Thus, if the 
case duration relationships represented by the retention 
function remain stable through time, a constant assessment 
rate applied to each year©s indemnity payments would fund 
each injury cohort©s future benefit adjustment payments. 
For this reason we can confine our attention to a single 
cohort without loss of generality.
Each insurer would probably pay the same assessment rate 
on his base year indemnity. It would be possible to introduce 
experience rating, although this might prove difficult to im 
plement. Under an experience rating system it would be 
necessary to differentiate between employers on the basis of 
the proportion of their workers© compensation benefit costs 
that flow to long term as opposed to short term disability 
cases. Thus an employer who experienced no long term 
disabilities, and hence no claims against the benefit adjust 
ment fund, might have his or her assessment rate reduced. 
One with many claims against the fund could be assessed at a 
higher rate. There would be a serious complication introduc 
ed by the redemption possibility in Michigan, however. This 
problem will be outlined later in the chapter.
It is assumed that the funds from the assessment would be 
received on July 1 of the year following the base year. This 
reflects current Second Injury Fund practice and should 
allow sufficient time for administrative detail. The funds 
would then be invested (perhaps in a way that would improve 
economic conditions in the state) and interest earnings would 
begin. For the purpose of the simulation, a return of 7 per 
cent is applied against the average balance for each year.
3. Alternatively, it would be possible to structure a benefit adjustment fund as a "pay-as- 
you-go" operation. However, fear of the "blank check" element inherent in the unfunded 
liabilities of such a plan militates against it. See chapter 5 for a discussion of this and other 
alternative fund formulations.
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This seems low at the present time, but recall that these pro 
jections cover a 50-year time span. It would seem preferable 
to err on the side of caution. Alternative assumptions will be 
presented in chapter 4, Sensitivity Analysis.
The average annual balance of the benefit adjustment 
fund would naturally be influenced by the timing of 
disbursements as well. As with the Second Injury Fund, it is 
assumed that insurers will be given responsibility for making 
benefit adjustment payments as supplements to the regular 
weekly payments, with reimbursement from the fund at six- 
month intervals. Adjustment payments would commence on 
the anniversary of the injury, subject to a two-year waiting 
period. Under this plan, administrative expenses, both for 
the insurer and the fund, would be kept to a minimum. In 
the simulation, an allowance of 8 percent of disbursements 
has been made for administrative expenses of the fund. This 
is less than the Second Injury Fund experiences currently, 
but it is anticipated that this program will be simpler and also 
subject to less litigation than current Second Injury Fund 
operations.
For purposes of illustration, it may be useful to trace 
through step by step the first few years of operation of such a 
fund. Table 6 presents the results of one such simulation bas 
ed on the 1978 injury cohort, the latest one for which data 
are available. 4 An assessment would be levied against the in 
demnity paid by each insurer in 1978, a total for all insurers 
of $334,784,000. Let us assume the assessment rate is set at 
24.7 percent. Of course, this is not really an assumption, but
4. The simulations of the benefit adjustment fund operation to be presented here focus on 
ly on the 1978 injury cohort. The actual operation of such a fund may or may not allow 
commingling of the assessments from different base years, but the description of the fund©s 
operation is simplified if we confine our attention to a single cohort. It should be clear that 
the choice of any particular injury year for the simulation, while it would change the ab 
solute dollar amount needed to finance future benefits, should not change the relative 
amount, that is, the assessment rate.
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Table 6



























































































































































































































































































































Waiting period: 2 years
Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 5 percent compound
Interest earnings: 7 percent of average balance
Administrative costs: 8 percent of payout
FORWARD FUNDING REQUIRED: $82,700,000
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represents the "solution" of the simulation problem. It is the 
amount required to prefund the 50 years of benefit adjust 
ment payments directed by the plan. 5 As will be discussed 
below, this figure does not include any potential savings 
from Second Injury Fund differential benefit payments, dis 
qualification of some cases due to changes in the definition 
of disability or other statutory changes, or coordination of 
benefits with other income maintenance programs.
The $82,700,000 yield from this assessment would be 
received on July 1, 1979 and would immediately be invested 
and begin earning interest at 7 percent per year. But it is only 
invested for half of 1979, so interest earnings for the year 
would be only $2,894,500. Table 6 assumes there is a two- 
year waiting period before benefit adjustment begins, so no 
supplements are paid during 1979 for 1978 injuries. Accor 
dingly, no administrative costs are charged. At the end of 
1979, the benefit adjustment fund would show a balance of 
approximately $85,594,500. 6
From the discussion earlier of the retention function, it 
will be recalled that there were 7,624 cases from 1978 active 
at the end of 1978. Further, the retention function predicts 
that 3,050 cases from 1978 injuries will be active at the end of 
1979. So, as we enter calendar year 1980, there would be just
5. Fifty years was chosen as the practical expression of "lifetime benefits" for one injury 
cohort. The fact that the simulation shows payments to 77 individuals in the 50th year of 
operation should be taken as indicative of the conservatism of the retention function. It 
should also be pointed out that the fund ends the 50-year period with a balance of over 
$500,000. This is a consequence of the method used to derive the assessment amount in the 
first place. An iterative technique was employed that essentially proceeds by trial and error. 
A specific assessment amount is picked to start the problem and the amount is reduced in 
$100,000 steps until the fund goes broke before year 51. The last iteration, $100,000 higher 
than the amount that went broke, is the solution. Because of the compound interest interac 
tions in this problem, $100,000 at the start makes a surprising impact over the life of the 
fund.
6. Of course none of these figures should be taken as precise estimates. Given the nature of 
the assumptions, all numbers used in the simulations should be taken as indicative of a 
general range even when they are reported more precisely.
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over 3,000 workers© compensation cases from 1978 drawing 
weekly benefits. As these cases reach their second injury an 
niversary date in 1980, they would become eligible for infla 
tion supplements. Of course, not all 3,050 cases will become 
eligible on January 1; they will be spread more or less evenly 
over the calendar year, as were the original injuries.
The "average" case would become eligible for adjustment 
at mid-year, on July 1. Thus, the "average" case would 
receive one-half of the plan©s 5 percent adjustment supple 
ment due in 1980. 7 Injuries that occurred on January 1, 1978 
would receive the 5 percent supplement during all of 1980, 
but injuries that occurred on December 31, 1978 would 
receive no benefit adjustment payments during 1980. The 
average adjustment payment would be 5 percent for half the 
year (or 2.5 percent for a full year). The actual dollar 
amount of the average benefit adjustment during 1980 can 
then be calculated as the product of the average weekly com 
pensation rate for 1978 injuries (reported by the Bureau as 
$138.78), times 26 weeks (half the year), times the adjust 
ment factor (5 percent), or $180.41. This amounts to 2.5 per 
cent of the typical annual compensation payment of 
$7,216.56 for 1978 injuries. Thus, the third column of table 6 
shows 2.47 percent as the average adjustment factor paid 
during 1980. 8
But this average adjustment factor will likewise not be 
paid to all 3,050 cases active at the beginning of 1980 but 
rather to the "average" number of cases active during 1980.
7. In the simulations presented here, the adjustment factor is assumed to rise by the same 
amount each year so as to facilitate calculations. This should be interpreted as the typical or 
average annual adjustment. It should be pointed out, however, that variation in the annual 
adjustment factor will have a corresponding impact on the fund balance.
8. There is a slight discrepancy here because the simulation algorithm calculates the adjust 
ment factor as [(1 + r)^ 1/2 -!] where r represents the average annual adjustment factor and t 
represents the number of years for which adjustment is being paid. For r= .05 and t= 1, 
this expression yields .0247.
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Assuming that the closure of cases is spread throughout the 
calendar year in roughly the same way as injuries are, the 
average number of active cases would simply be the number 
midway between the number active at the end of 1979 (3,050) 
and the number active at the end of 1980 (3,050 x .85 or 
2,593). Therefore, table 6 shows that the average number of 
cases paid during 1980 is 2,822.
Now the total cost of adjusting all active 1978 cases in 
calendar year 1980 is the product of the annual base compen 
sation amount ($7,216.56), times the average adjustment 
factor for these cases in 1980 (.0247), times the average 
number of cases paid during 1980 (2,822). The result 
(without rounding) is $502,918 and this would be the amount 
of the reimbursements during 1980. Further, an amount of 
$40,233 would be deducted for administrative expenses (8 
percent of 1980 adjustment costs). So the total 
disbursements from the benefit adjustment fund during 1980 
for 1978 injuries would be $543,151.
Interest earnings of the fund during 1980 would be 7 per 
cent of the average balance during the year. But the begin 
ning year balance of $85,594,500 would be held for six 
months until insurers filed for their reimbursements. 
Therefore, the first half of the year would net $2,995,808 in 
interest earnings. Assuming half the year©s adjustment ex 
penses were reimbursable on July 1 (actually, it would 
always be somewhat less than half), the average fund balance 
for the second half of the year would be $85,322,925 
($85,594,500 less 50 percent of $543,151). Interest earnings 
on this amount for half a year at 7 percent would be 
$2,986,302. Summing the interest earnings for the two halves 
of the year yields $5,982,110, the amount shown in the fifth 
column of table 6 for 1980. Finally, adding the interest in 
come for 1980, subtracting adjustment payments and ad 
ministrative expenses for 1980, we arrive at the 1980 year- 
end balance of the fund, $91,033,458.
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This repetitive process is continued for each year up to 
2028, or 50 years following the injury. The simulation model 
is driven simply by the retention function and the adjustment 
factors, which should serve to reemphasize the critical im 
portance of the retention function in this operation. Under 
the 5 percent compound adjustment factor plan with a two- 
year waiting period shown in table 6, total annual adjust 
ment costs for the 1978 injury cohort reach a peak of $9.9 
million in 1998. Thereafter, adjustment costs decline slowly 
as the number of cases to be adjusted shrinks more rapidly 
than the adjustment factor for remaining cases rises. 9
From the peak near $10 million, annual adjustment costs 
for the 1978 injury cohort fall gradually to $5 million by 
2028 in the simulation presented in table 6. The later years 
are characterized by very large adjustment payments to a 
small number of cases. In 2028 the fully adjusted benefit is 
projected at nearly $77,000 per year. Thus each surviving 
case is extremely important in determining future adjustment 
costs.
The retention function projects that there will be 77 cases 
from 1978 active after 50 years. As mentioned earlier, this 
should be taken as a measure of the conservatism of the 
retention function itself. Of course no one can accurately 
predict what the extreme tail of the case duration distribu 
tion will look like, and we do not claim to do so either. Run 
ning the simulation for 50 years and then terminating with 
cases still active seems preferable to trying to estimate more 
closely when the precision is illusory anyway. The judgment 
as to whether the benefit adjustment case population is ade 
quately estimated will be left to the reader. Suffice it to say
9. It might seem that adjustment costs would decline by 3 percent per year since the reten 
tion function after year 20 dictates that 8 percent of last year©s cases will close while the ef 
fective compensation rate increases by 5 percent. However, a 5 percent increase in received 
weekly compensation is more than a 5 percent increase in the adjustment factor since total 
compensation is represented by one plus the adjustment factor.
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that the tail of the active case distribution is extremely im 
portant to this single cohort simulation, but it would be 
much less important in the operation of a benefit adjustment 
fund as a whole.
While the $9.8 million in adjustment payments to the 1978 
injury cohort in year 2000 (table 6) is the major item of in 
terest for that year in a single cohort simulation, it would be 
only one of 20 cohorts receiving reimbursements from a 
benefit adjustment fund at that time. By the time the fund 
reached the year 2028, there would be 48 cohorts in payment 
status, and whether adjustment costs for the 1978 cohort 
amounted to $5.3 million or $4.3 million would be relatively 
less important to the benefit adjustment fund than it appears 
in table 6. 10
It is also interesting to note that the peak year-end balance 
for the fund occurs in 1992 as benefit adjustment payments 
and administrative expenses overtake the interest earnings of 
the fund. Thus, for the first 14 years the fund balance is 
growing, and it is not until after 31 years that the balance is 
back down to the original assessment amount. In a sense, the 
first 30 years of adjustment payments are financed with the 
interest earnings of the fund. Taking the 50-year simulation 
period as a whole, projected benefit adjustment payments to 
the 1978 injury cohort total over $343,000,000 or slightly 
more than 100 percent of base year indemnity payments. 
Clearly, the bulk of these payments is financed with the pro 
jected interest earnings of the fund, which total more than 
$288,000,000 over the 50 years. Thus the assumption about 
the interest earnings of the fund is also critical. The higher 
the interest earnings of the fund, the lower the original 
assessment rate necessary to prefund the future benefits.
The assumption of 7 percent earnings on fund balances 
does appear conservative at the present time, but so does a 5
10. We will discuss the operation of the full fund later in this chapter.
46 Simulated A djustmen t Fund
percent adjustment factor for weekly benefits. To a con 
siderable degree, it is not the absolute levels but the spread 
between these two critical parameters that conditions the 
solution to the prefunding problem. 11 Thus the critical 
assumption is that the rate of return on fund investments will 
be 2 percent per year greater than the adjustment factor, 
presumably based on price or wage increases. This amounts 
to assuming that the real rate of interest will be about 2 per 
cent per annum in a world of 5 percent inflation. These levels 
are thought to be appropriate for a 50-year time span, but of 
course no one can tell for certain what the future will bring. 
That is one reason table 6 is properly termed a simulation 
rather than a prediction.
In summary, under the assumptions about the duration of 
workers© compensation disability cases that are contained in 
the retention function presented earlier, and given the 
parameters of the benefit adjustment plan that we have just 
discussed, it is projected that an assessment of about 25 per 
cent against 1978 indemnity payments (yielding $82.7 
million) will be sufficient to prefund 50 years of benefit ad 
justment payments to the 1978 cohort of injured workers. Of 
course, an assessment of 24.7 percent against annual indem 
nity payments would constitute a lesser proportion of all an 
nual benefits. Since medical payments in Michigan are about 
25 percent of total annual benefit payments, the 24.7 percent 
assessment would amount to an 18.5 percent increase in an 
nual benefit payments (24.7 x .75). This makes inflation 
protection an expensive item, but not impossibly so.
Furthermore, this cost level compares very favorably with 
the National Council on Compensation Insurance estimate
11. Actually, the prefunded assessment level responds to the two parameters in very dif 
ferent ways. The interest earnings are most important in early years as the adjustment 
payments are still small and the fund balance grows rapidly. But the compound interest ef 
fect of the annual adjustment factor dominates the distant future. We will examine the sen 
sitivity of the required funding level to these parameters in the following chapter.
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of 31.1 percent for a 5 percent annual cap plan prepared for 
the Michigan Workers© Compensation Reform Task Force in 
September 1979. 12 Unfortunately, it is not possible to deter 
mine what part of this difference may be due to the special 
operating circumstances of a state fund and what part is due 
to different assumptions about the case load on the fund or 
other parameters. We will, however, in the next chapter, ex 
amine the sensitivity of our estimate to assumptions about 
the adjustment factor, the interest earnings rate, and the 
number of cases to be adjusted.
Before abandoning the question of the cost impact of a 
benefit adjustment program such as that discussed here, one 
additional issue should be raised. While we will present the 
cost of benefit adjustment principally in terms of the pre- 
funding assessment level required, this dollar amount is 
capable of expression in a number of different ways. Most 
frequently, we will refer simply to the assessment rate on 
base year indemnity that would be necessary to raise the re 
quired funds. But, as was just demonstrated, this is not a fair 
measurement of the cost impact of the program relative to 
total workers© compensation benefits paid, due to the exclu 
sion of medical benefits from the assessment base.
Similarly, the cost of benefit adjustment relative to total 
benefits (including medical) does not fairly represent the true 
cost impact on the workers© compensation insurance 
premium dollar. For example, the $82.7 million assessment 
level necessary to prefund lifetime inflation adjustment 
payments to the 1978 Michigan injury cohort under the 
assumptions of table 6 would only constitute 10.3 percent of 
the 1978 Standard Earned Premium in Michigan of $800.4 
million. Further, if it is assumed that the insured and self- 
insured sectors contribute proportionally to the long term
12. There are actually two discrepancies between the estimates. The NCCI estimate was for 
a program to begin with the 1980 cohort and did not include the two-year waiting period.
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disabled claimant population, then only about 60 percent of 
the benefit adjustment case burden would be from the in 
sured sector. Thus the insured sector©s share of the assess 
ment would be $49.6 million, which would amount to only 
6.2 percent of the 1978 Standard Earned Premium.
To avoid confusion, we will refer to costs in dollars and 
the assessment rate required to raise the necessary funds for 
benefit adjustment purposes, but this should not obscure the 
fact that the assessment rate does not adequately represent 
the cost impact of such a program. Let us proceed to ex 
amine some other issues that bear on the question of the in 
terpretation to be given to the simulation estimates 
developed here.
Evaluation of Cost Estimate
While this estimate of the forward funding level required 
to make lifetime benefit adjustment payments to the 1978 in 
jury cohort has been carefully prepared, it is a certainty that 
it will be incorrect. These projections are very rough and we 
shall see in the next chapter that the forward funding level is 
very sensitive to the adjustment factors, the interest earnings 
rate, and the number of cases to be adjusted. These key 
parameters are largely outside policy control, yet they must 
be estimated far in advance to determine the forward fund 
ing required. But it is simply not possible to eliminate the 
great uncertainties inherent in dealing with the future. The 
real question is, "by how much and in what direction will we 
miss the true assessment level needed to prefund the plan?" 
If the plan is overfunded, it would be a relatively simple mat 
ter to reduce the assessment rates for subsequent cohorts to 
bring them into line with actual experience. The excess funds 
could be refunded or used as a reserve for future contingen 
cies.
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On the other hand, if the plan turns out to be underfund 
ed, more difficult adjustments will be required. There would 
seem to be three choices, general fund revenues, supplemen 
tal assessments, or commingling of funds for different 
cohorts. The injection of general fund revenues would be an 
obvious solution to an assessment shortfall; whether that is 
tenable, or preferable, must be left to future legislatures to 
decide. Supplemental assessments would be another possible 
solution. However, if the benefit adjustment funds for dif 
ferent cohorts are not to be commingled, it would be 
necessary to level the supplemental assessment on the par 
ticular cohort involved. If the shortfall were not discernible 
for 10 or 20 years after the injury year, this would give rise to 
some very difficult administrative questions.
But if funds for different cohorts were commingled, much 
of this could be avoided. We have seen that a major share of 
the benefit adjustment payments is provided by the interest 
earnings of the fund, and that the annual interest earnings 
exceed annual adjustment costs for many years of fund 
operation. Under these circumstances, commingling of 
funds from different cohorts could be accomplished without 
abandoning the prefunding principle. With careful account 
ing allocations, each cohort could be tracked separately for 
the purpose of determining the adequacy of the original 
assessment in the long-run. Yet the assessment process could 
be smoothed to some degree by implicit borrowing between 
cohort assessments.
Thus, the original assessment rate would be set at a level 
that is expected to yield lifetime adjustment benefits for each 
injury cohort. If, however, the assessment subsequently 
proves unequal to the task, payments are continued from the 
fund, with corrections made in future assessment rates to 
bring the whole fund into balance. Given the fund simula 
tions presented here, it is apparent that a shift of a few 
million dollars would have enormous corrective potential if
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implemented soon enough. Of course this process would be 
reversible in the case of over-sufficiency of assessment levels. 
Such a procedure, while not seriously compromising the 
prefunding principle, would offer a mechanism for adjusting 
the fund to future realities as they are revealed. Thus com 
mingling of funds with separate internal accounting for each 
cohort would seem to be indicated.
While a cautious approach to the important determinants 
of benefit adjustment costs can help prevent embarrassment 
later, there is really nothing that can be done about potential 
utilization levels. The retention function employed here is 
rooted irrevocably in current claims experience, as revealed 
in some simple Bureau of Workers© Disability Compensation 
statistics. But the current system does not provide benefit ad 
justment payments to all claimants. Thus, if there is a 
behavioral response to the imposition of a benefit adjust 
ment fund, either by insurers or by claimants, we will find 
ourselves in uncharted waters.
As an example, consider the situation with regard to 
redemptions. Whatever the motivation of the parties to a 
redemption (or compromise and release settlement), it is 
clear that they have agreed to the settlement. The existence 
of a benefit adjustment program would change the situation 
materially. If everything else in the system remains as it was, 
the present value of the typical permanent disability claim 
will rise to reflect the future escalated benefits. This might 
fundamentally affect the attractiveness of a redemption to 
one or both parties. But consider the impact on the benefit 
adjustment fund of any change in the status quo.
Redemption payments are included in the assessment base 
for the year in which they are paid. But no continuing claim 
is associated with that payment, so there will be no benefit 
adjustment payments in the future emanating from the 
redeemed claim. Thus the redemption contributes to the
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assessment side of the fund, but does not participate on the 
disbursement side. If the proportion of redemptions was to 
increase as a result of imposing a benefit adjustment fund, 
the financial position of the fund would be strengthened. But 
suppose the proportion of redemptions were to decline; then 
the financial health of the fund could be threatened. Clearly, 
the anticipated benefit adjustment payments would be 
greater than otherwise because the number of cases to be ad 
justed in the future would be greater. The impact on the 
assessment side would depend on the relative dollar 
magnitude of the redemption settlements, but it is not 
unlikely that the total redemption dollars might decline, fur 
ther compounding the problem. In any event, the fund 
would be faced with a changed world, but holding resources 
calculated to cope with the old world.
Finally, we come to the question of overall program ef 
fects. All the estimated costs mentioned in this simulation 
have been direct costs, allowing for no interactions with 
other aspects of the workers© compensation system. We have 
just seen one example of such a potential interaction that 
could have unforeseeable impact on a benefit adjustment 
fund, but there would be others as well. First and most ob 
vious would be the present Second Injury Fund. 
Presumably, a benefit adjustment fund would take over a 
good deal of the future burden of the Second Injury Fund 
since permanent and total disabilities would be adjusted 
right along with others, thus reducing the need for future dif 
ferential payments from the Second Injury Fund. The 
magnitude of this overlap is not clear, but the case load of 
the Second Injury Fund should stabilize and then gradually 
decline in the future through attrition. These unknown sav 
ings should be counted as a net reduction from the cost of a 
benefit adjustment fund.
A second possible impact would involve coordination of 
benefits. If workers© compensation benefits are to be coor-
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dinated in the future with Social Security payments, private 
pensions, or other income maintenance programs as propos 
ed before the Michigan Workers© Compensation Reform 
Task Force, this too would presumably have an impact on 
the benefit adjustment fund. It would seem reasonable that 
any coordination of benefits would reduce the burden on the 
fund by reducing the effective compensation rate that is be 
ing adjusted. Once again, the dollar savings from this in 
teraction are completely unknown, but they would reduce 
the net cost of a benefit adjustment fund.
Third, any specific statutory change might affect 
qualification for benefit adjustment payments. By using all 
active cases in the estimation of the retention function, we 
have implicitly assumed that no cases would be disqualified 
from benefit adjustment. 13 But some Michigan proposals 
have excluded partial disabilities, scheduled disabilities, or 
even fatalities from adjustment. If a proposal were adopted 
that provided for some specific disqualifications, this would 
clearly lower the number of cases eligible for adjustment 
and, hence, the costs of a benefit adjustment plan. The same 
result might be produced by a change in the definition of 
disability, although this would be more likely to affect the 
entire case population in the same way, thus reducing the 
assessment base as well as the future case population eligible 
for benefit adjustment.
One change that should not substantially affect the results 
presented here would be a change in the benefit formula, or a 
change in the maximums or minimums. While these changes 
would influence the average compensation rate which is to be 
adjusted in the future, they should impact on the assessment
13. We will touch this issue again in chapter 5 when alternative fund formulations are 
discussed.
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base in a proportional manner. 14 Thus the assessment rate 
necessary to prefund benefit adjustment payments should 
not be changed.
In recognition of all these uncertainties, the cost estimates 
presented here are to be taken as indicative rather than 
definitive, a sketch rather than a blueprint. They seem to be 
conservatively estimated, but only the passage of time can 
reveal the truth.
Full Fund Operation
The single cohort analysis is very effective in describing 
the nature of the fund operation in a "deposit and 
withdrawal" sense. It is also a necessary tool for making cost 
comparisons of alternative plans and various states of the 
world. Without the present value content of the single cohort 
analysis it would be very difficult to compare different situa 
tions. But the single cohort analysis does tend to conceal 
another important feature in the operation of a benefit ad 
justment fund, and that is the magnitude of the fund 
balances that will be generated.
In table 6 it was projected that the $82.7 million in for 
ward funding for the 1978 cohort, which would be received 
at the middle of 1979, would grow to a balance of $125 
million in 1992 before it begins to gradually decline. But by 
1992 there will have been assessments levied on 13 other in 
jury cohorts, and they can be expected to follow the general 
pattern shown in table 6 as well. Thus the fund will hold a 
huge reserve against future liabilities. This is not to say that 
the reserves are out of line with the liabilities, simply that the 
absolute magnitude of the reserves may be unsettling. To 
fairly assess the proposal for a state benefit adjustment fund, 
it is necessary to examine the operation of the full fund.
14. But see the discussion of the assessment base in chapter 5 for a more complete treat 
ment of this issue.
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In order to deal with the operation of a fund that will have 
responsibility for benefit adjustment payments to all cohorts 
(rather than just one), it is necessary to project future 
workers© compensation indemnity cost levels. We need to 
predict how adjustment costs will rise as we add additional 
injury cohorts year by year, while at the same time providing 
additional benefit adjustment increments to older injury 
cohorts. But we also need to predict changes in the assess 
ment base, that is, total indemnity payments to all previous 
cohorts for each future year.
None of these things can be done adequately due to the 
lack of data, but it is possible to provide an illustrative exer 
cise based on some of the same simple assumptions 
employed earlier in the chapter. To be consistent with the 
simulation exercise of table 6, let us assume that the average 
weekly compensation rate will increase by 5 percent per year. 
Let us further assume that the number of workers© compen 
sation claims will increase by 4 percent per year on the 
average. 15 If there is no significant change in the average 
duration of disability, the result of these assumptions will be 
an increase of 9.2 percent in indemnity costs from one injury 
cohort to the next.
Under this hypothetical set of circumstances, total weekly 
indemnity payments would rise by 9.2 percent annually as 
well, once the case population had matured. But we start the 
exercise with a case population characterized by a finite 
origin, the year 1965 when lifetime benefits were made 
available to general disability claimants under Michigan 
statute. Because of this finite origin problem, total weekly 
compensation payments will tend to grow more rapidly than 
the baseline figure of 9.2 percent for a number of years. 
With a stable assessment rate, this would result in slightly
15. In fact, the rate of increase in voluntarily paid workers© compensation claims in 
Michigan over the period 1972-1978 was 3.9 percent per year.
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higher assessment income than otherwise expected. This 
complication has been ignored in the results to be presented 
here, but it should provide an additional safety margin in the 
operation of the fund.
It is also necessary to make some assumption about the 
future course of redemption settlements, since they con 
stitute an important part of the assessment base as well. 
While there are a number of choices here, the simplest has 
been elected. It is assumed that total redemption payments 
will rise at the same rate as total weekly indemnity, namely 
9.2 percent annually. Given these hypothetical "facts"about 
the assessment base, and employing the method described 
earlier for estimating the annual adjustment costs for each 
cohort, it is possible to simulate the operation of a benefit 
adjustment fund for all cohorts.
Table 7 shows what could be expected. Assessment income 
would increase by 9.2 percent each year, reflecting both the 
increase in the assessment base and the anticipated cost of 
future adjustment payments. Annual adjustment payments 
would rise very rapidly as each year a new cohort would 
come into adjustment status and all previous cohorts would 
receive another year©s credit in their adjustment factor. The 
only offsetting factor would be the closure of some cases 
from each cohort, as specified in the retention function. But 
despite the rapid rise in adjustment payments, they never 
even overtake the annual interest earnings of the fund. Thus, 
the fund balance will continue to grow indefinitely, rising 
from a projected $85.6 million at the end of 1979 to $569.2 
million in 1983, $1.1 billion in 1986, $2.1 billion in 1990, 
$4.0 billion in 1995, and so on.
While these numbers are not to be taken seriously as 
predictions, they are illustrative of the dynamics of a 
prefunded operation. Because of the long time horizon 
necessary when dealing with lifetime benefit adjustment
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payments, the gross annual payout is smaller than both the 
annual assessment income and the annual interest earnings 
of the fund. The result is a massive reserve account. There is 
some question whether it would be desirable to accumulate 
such reserves in the public sector. Of course, much would de 
pend on just what sort of investment strategy would be 
followed by the trustees of the fund. But it is interesting to 
note that fears of the potential economic impact of the 
reserve fund precipitated intense debate in the early years of 
the Old Age Insurance System (Social Security). 16
The original financing plan for Social Security called for a 
payroll tax (combined employee and employer shares) which 
would rise gradually to 6 percent in 1949. The yield from this 
tax, when combined with the interest earnings of the reserve 
funds, was projected to be sufficient to pay the entire cost of 
the program for the foreseeable future. The reserve funds to 
be accumulated were quite large, projected to grow to $47 
billion by 1980, and would eventually provide interest earn 
ings that would pay 40 percent of the benefits. In other 
words, the payroll tax was to carry 60 percent of the annual 
cost burden, and interest earnings on the reserves the re 
mainder. But the absolute magnitude of the reserve fund 
came under Republican attack in 1937. According to Senator 
Vandenberg, "It is scarcely conceivable that rational men 
should propose such an unmanageable accumulation of 
funds in one place in a democracy." 17 While the debate that 
ensued raised many basic issues of financing, fears of the 
large reserves may be said to have started the evolution 
toward the compromise plan that amounted to pay-as-you- 
go funding with a small reserve account.
16. See Martha Derthick Policymaking for Social Security Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, ]979),Ch. 11, for a discussion of the issues and the solutions to the Social 
Security financing problems.
17. Congressional Record (March 17, 1937), p. 2324, quoted in Derthick, p. 232.
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The reserves of a Michigan benefit adjustment fund for 
workers© compensation claimants would clearly be small 
compared with those of a prefunded OASDI program. 
However, in principle the concerns are similar. Some people 
would fear the tendency to liberalize benefits as a conse 
quence of the size of the fund. Some would question the 
wisdom of a government agency draining funds from 
business firms that may be short of working capital in the 
first place. Presumably, some would ask why such sums 
should be collected now when they will not be needed for 
many years, as they did in the Social Security debates. These 
issues and many more need airing in public debate. The pur 
pose of this paper is to help prompt that debate.
The magnitude of the reserves that apparently would be 
generated in a benefit adjustment fund also puts a different 
perspective on some of the fund management problems rais 
ed in the last section. From the evidence of table 7, it would 
appear that simply detecting overfunding or underfunding 
may be a problem. Thus, the strategy of separate tracking of 
each cohort would appear to be of critical importance to the 
management of the fund. Only by reference to the separate 
single cohorts could the true health of the benefit adjustment 
fund be determined.
Having completed the review of the operation of a benefit 
adjustment fund under one set of assumptions about the real 
world, let us go on to examine the sensitivity of the estimated 
single cohort forward funding level to these assumptions. In 
the next chapter the impact of the average annual adjustment 
factor, the fund interest earnings rate, and the number of 
cases to be adjusted will be considered.
CHAPTER 4
Sensitivity Analysis
The last chapter presented a simulation of the operation of 
a benefit adjustment fund for workers© compensation cases 
in Michigan under one set of assumptions about the nature 
of the world in which the fund would operate. But there are 
two very important reasons to examine alternative states of 
the world.
First, given the certainty that we will not correctly an 
ticipate the future, it is important to know what the probable 
range of variation will be. For instance, we used an assumed 
average annual adjustment factor of 5 percent in the last 
chapter. It was necessary to choose some number to do the 
simulation, and 5 percent is justifiable on historical grounds; 
but we cannot be very confident that it (or any other par 
ticular number) will be correct.
On the other hand, it is possible to be much more confi 
dent that the long-run annual average inflation rate will fall 
in the range of 4 to 8 percent. Then, if the forward funding 
level required for each of these likely inflation rates is 
known, we can choose the assessment level that satisfies our 
requirement for safety from serious underassessment. In 
fact, it will be shown that this choice is a prerequisite to 
establishing a benefit adjustment fund.
Second, a sensitivity analysis is valuable as a way of verify 
ing the stability of the simulation solution. It is reassuring to
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know that the forward funding level required changes in a 
regular, predictable way with changes in the parameters. 
This chapter will demonstrate that the benefit adjustment 
fund simulation has this characteristic. Variation in the three 
major external parameters the annual adjustment factor, 
the interest earnings rate, and the number of cases to be ad 
justed will be examined.
Sensitivity to Adjustment Factor 
and Interest Rate
Table 8 presents the simulation for the 1978 injury cohort 
of a prospective benefit adjustment plan that would pay a 6 
percent compound benefit increase for every year after the 
waiting period of two years. Again, the interpretation of the 
6 percent would be that it was the average annual adjust 
ment. All fund parameters are the same as before, except for 
the adjustment factor. The number of cases to be adjusted is 
the same, the interest earnings rate is the same, and the ad 
ministrative cost rate is the same. However, the assessment 
necessary to prefund this plan is $109.2 million, or 32.6 per 
cent of total 1978 indemnity payments.
Adjustment costs are greater in every year than under the 
plan presented in table 6, but the difference becomes con 
siderable as one moves farther into the future. This is strictly 
the result of the compound interest effect on the adjustment 
factor. For instance, in year 2010 the 5 percent simulation of 
table 6 provides an adjustment payment of about three-and- 
one-half times the original benefit, whereas the 6 percent 
simulation pays nearly a five-fold adjustment. Under the 
former plan, the average annual adjusted compensation rate 
for 1978 cases would be nearly $32,000 in 2010, whereas 
under the latter it would exceed $42,000.
Under the 6 percent adjustment simulation, the annual 
cost of adjustment peaks in year 2000 at just over $13.1
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Waiting period: 2 years
Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 6 percent compound
Interest earnings: 7 percent of average balance
Administrative costs: 8 percent of payout
FORWARD FUNDING REQUIRED: $109,200,000
62 Sensitivity Analysis
million, about one-third higher than the earlier figure. 
Because of the compound interest effect, annual adjustment 
payments to the 1978 cohort in 2028 would be almost two- 
thirds greater than in the previous simulation. Adjustment 
costs for the full 50-year simulation total over $480 million, 
or 40 percent more than in the 5 percent simulation.
Table 9 presents the results of a benefit adjustment fund 
simulation using a 4 percent compound adjustment factor. 
The required prefunding level for this plan is $60.5 million, 
or 18.1 percent of 1978 indemnity payments. In this simula 
tion, annual adjustment costs for the 1978 cohort reach their 
peak in 1997 at only $7.2 million. Fund disbursements (ad 
justment costs and administrative expenses) surpass interest 
earnings of the fund in 1992. Total 50-year adjustment costs 
for the 1978 cohort are projected at $237.7 million, or about 
71 percent of 1978 indemnity payments.
Apparently the prefunding level required for a benefit ad 
justment plan of the sort contemplated here is very sensitive 
to the adjustment factor. When the annual adjustment fac 
tor was increased from 5 to 6 percent, the 20 percent increase 
in the adjustment factor produced a 32 percent increase in re 
quired assessment level. When the adjustment factor was 
reduced from 5 to 4 percent, the 20 percent decrease produc 
ed a 27 percent cut in funding required. Thus, the forward 
funding level appears to respond more than proportionally 
to changes in the annual adjustment factor.
However, by varying only the annual adjustment factor 
we are in effect also varying the real rate of interest, since it 
is unrealistic to suppose that the interest earnings of the fund 
would not vary with the adjustment factor. In the long-run, 
both should reflect the underlying inflation rate in the 
economy. But when the adjustment factor was advanced 
from 5 percent in table 6 to 6 percent for table 8, the dif 
ferential of the interest rate over the rate of wage increase
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Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 4 percent compound
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was reduced from 2 percent to 1 percent. Contrarily, when 
comparing the 5 percent simulation to the 4 percent, the real 
interest rate was effectively increased from 2 percent to 3 
percent. Thus we have confounded the effects of changes in 
two critical parameters.
Table 10 presents the simulation of a 6 percent compound 
benefit adjustment plan with an 8 percent return on fund 
balances, thus restoring a real rate of interest of 2 percent. 
The necessary forward funding for the plan under these 
assumptions is $92.2 million, or 27.5 percent of 1978 indem 
nity. This level of funding will provide the same $480 million 
in future benefit adjustment payments to the 1978 injury 
cohort as were detailed in table 8. However, with the restora 
tion of the 2 percent differential between the rate of interest 
earnings and the rate of benefit adjustment, the necessary 
assessment rate has declined from 32.6 percent to 27.5 per 
cent of 1978 indemnity payments.
Table 11 shows that the opposite happens with the 4 per 
cent adjustment plan when the real interest rate is reduced 
from 3 to 2 percent. The assessment level necessary to pre- 
fund the plan rises from 18.1 percent in table 9 to 21.4 per 
cent here. In both cases, the assessment levels have moved 
halfway back to the 24.7 percent level of the 5 percent plan 
of table 6. Thus, the earlier conclusions about the sensitivity 
of the assessment rate to the adjustment factor were 
premature.
Table 12 shows the dollar level and (in parentheses) the 
assessment rate necessary to prefund benefit adjustment 
plans for the 1978 injury cohort (under the assumptions 
detailed heretofore) with various combinations of annual ad 
justment factors and interest earnings rates. Annual adjust 
ment factors from 4 percent to 8 percent and interest rates 
from 6 percent to 10 percent are reported. Real interest rates 
of from 1 to 3 percent (obtained by subtracting the annual
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Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 6 percent compound
Interest earnings: 8 percent of average balance
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Waiting period: 2 years
Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 4 percent compound
Interest earnings: 6 percent of average balance
Administrative costs: 8 percent of payout
FORWARD FUNDING REQUIRED: $71,600,000
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adjustment factor from the interest rate) are included in 
table 12.
The diagonal elements indicate the effect of larger adjust 
ment factors, holding the real interest rate at 2 percent. As 
the annual adjustment factor increases, the required assess 
ment increases but at a decreasing rate. If the annual adjust 
ment factor increases from 4 to 5 percent, the prefunding 
level rises by over 15 percent (from $71.6 million to $82.7 
million). But increasing the annual adjustment factor from 7 
to 8 percent only raises the forward funding required by 7 
percent (from $100.3 million to $107.3 million). On the 
average, over the range of adjustment factors listed in table 
12, one percentage point more in the annual adjustment fac 
tor leads to a 10 percent increase in the necessary forward 
funding level for the benefit adjustment plan.
Table 12 also demonstrates the sensitivity of the required 
funding level to the real interest rate. Holding the adjust 
ment factor constant at 5 percent, the necessary forward 
funding level increases from $70.3 million at 8 percent in 
terest (3 percent real interest rate) to $82.7 million at 7 per 
cent interest, and to $98.5 million at 6 percent interest (1 per 
cent real interest rate). Similar sensitivity is shown for the 6 
percent benefit adjustment plan. On the average, a decline in 
the real interest rate of one percentage point leads to nearly a 
17 percent increase in the required forward funding level. 
Thus the benefit adjustment fund is shown to be more sen 
sitive to the earned interest rate than to the adjustment factor.
Nevertheless, the import of table 12 is that it demonstrates 
the sensitivity to both of these critical parameters. Further 
more, while one can be fairly confident that we have covered 
the likely range of the average values of these parameters for 
the next 50 years, we have not necessarily captured the 
possibilities in year-to-year variation. For instance, suppose 
the benefit adjustment fund was started in a time of rapid in-
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Table 12
Forward Funding Required for Benefit Adjustment Plan*


















































*Dollar amounts are in millions of dollars. The figures in parentheses indicate the assess 
ment rate on 1978 indemnity payments that would raise the required funds.
flation by historic standards (such as the present). Then one 
could expect both interest earnings of the fund and annual 
adjustment factors to be high in the early years. But because 
interest earnings exceed adjustment costs for many years in 
all the plans simulated above, the result will be higher year- 
end balances for the fund in these early years. When infla 
tion subsided, the fund would face the future with larger 
"reserves" than were originally anticipated. Thus, even 
though the link between interest rates and adjustment factors 
was maintained, the "twist" in the impact of these 
parameters would benefit the fund. Of course, the opposite 
circumstance would have contrary consequences.
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Last, it is necessary to discuss the range of estimated for 
ward funding levels required for benefit adjustment plans 
under various assumptions as shown in table 12. There is 
more than 100 percent variation from the lowest to the 
highest estimate presented there. It would be difficult to cope 
with this range as one sets about to establish the assessment 
rate to actually fund a benefit adjustment plan. But all the 
options of table 12 are not equally likely. If we assume the 
real rate of interest will be 2 percent and discount the 4 per 
cent and 8 percent annual adjustment factor variants, we are 
left with a much more manageable range. The low estimate, 
with a 5 percent annual adjustment factor and 7 percent fund 
interest earnings assumption, could be prefunded for $82.7 
million or about 25 percent of 1978 indemnity payments. 
The high estimate, assuming the 7 percent annual adjustment 
factor and 9 percent interest earnings, would require $100.3 
million or 30 percent of 1978 indemnity.
Thus it would appear fairly likely that the required assess 
ment level will fall below 30 percent of base year indemnity. 
If it were thought desirable to avoid any substantial risk of 
underassessment, the assessment rate could be set at one- 
third of base year indemnity. This would result in a net cost 
impact, taking medical expenses into account, of one-fourth 
of current workers© compensation benefit costs.
While a 25 to 30 percent estimated assessment range is 
much more satisfactory for policy purposes, there is still a 
range of indeterminacy here. There is some unknown prob 
ability that an assessment of 30 percent of 1978 indemnity 
payments would not be sufficient to make lifetime inflation 
adjustment payments to the 1978 injury cohort. There is no 
way around this dilemma when focusing on a single cohort. 
With multiple cohorts in a fund, it may not be quite so 
troublesome since there would be more opportunity to adjust 
to the situation as it develops. 1
1. Recall the discussion in chapter 3 about commingling funds from different cohorts.
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Leaving aside the issue of sensitivity to the adjustment fac 
tor, let us go on to consider the sensitivity of the forward 
funding level of a benefit adjustment plan to the number of 
cases to be adjusted. This amounts to a sensitivity analysis of 
the retention function.
Sensitivity to the Number of Cases
The last major external item that will bear heavily on the 
benefit adjustment fund is the number of cases to be ad 
justed. Note that we have now come full circle, having begun 
with the question of how many cases would need to be ad 
justed. A retention function was derived from past workers© 
compensation data and that retention function was used as 
the basis for simulating the operation of a benefit adjust 
ment fund. Now we return to ask: How sensitive are the for 
ward funding levels of such a plan to the number of cases to 
be adjusted? What if the retention function significantly 
misses the mark?
To begin with, the prefunding level will vary proportional 
ly with the number of cases. The forward funding required is 
nothing more than the present value of the stream of annual 
benefit adjustment payments into the future. Each year©s 
benefit adjustment cost is in turn the product of the adjust 
ment factor for that year, the basic unadjusted compensa 
tion rate, and the number of cases to be adjusted. But if the 
number of cases to be adjusted changes while the other fac 
tors do not, the annual adjustment cost in each year will 
change in precisely the same way as the number of cases.
Suppose that the pattern of case closure represented in the 
retention function developed earlier was correct, but that the 
actual number of cases is underestimated by 10 percent in 
each year. Then the adjustment costs in each future year will 
be 10 percent higher than estimated earlier, and the present
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value of the whole stream of annual adjustment costs will 
also be 10 percent higher. Thus, the estimated forward fund 
ing level will be 10 percent below the true required level.
Table 13 shows what would happen to the $82.7 million 
assessment estimated for the 5 percent annual adjustment 
factor plan (table 6) if the actual number of cases active turn 
ed out to be 10 percent higher than projected in each year. 
Since benefit adjustment costs would be 10 percent higher in 
each year, the balance of the fund would decline more rapid 
ly and interest earnings would fall more quickly as well. The 
net result is that the benefit adjustment fund would be able 
to pay annual inflation supplements to the 1978 injury 
cohort only for 33 years. To prefund the entire 50 years (i.e., 
lifetime benefits) would require an additional $8.3 million 
(10 percent of the $82.7 million) in 1978 dollars, or a total of 
$91.0 million. Of course, the opposite would be true if the 
number of cases to be adjusted was 10 percent lower than 
projected.
While the forward funding level for a benefit adjustment 
plan responds proportionally to a uniform change in the 
number of active cases, this is probably not the most likely 
distortion of reality contained in the fund simulations. It 
would seem more probable, given the limited empirical 
evidence upon which it is built, that the retention function 
will prove to be inaccurate in representing the case closure 
pattern. We will examine two additional retention function 
specifications, one pessimistic and one optimistic.
Table 14 shows the fund simulation with a "pessimistic" 
retention function for the 1978 injury cohort. The change 
here from the 5 percent adjustment factor simulation of 
table 6 is that the last step down in the retention rate has been 
eliminated. Recall that it was hypothesized that after 20 
years the closure rate would rise from 4 percent to 8 percent 
per year as a rising death rate overtook the aging beneficiary
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population. Table 14 does not include this step; the active 
case population declines uniformly by 4 percent per year 
commencing five years after the injury year. Thus, the 
distribution has a much "thicker" tail than previously con 
templated. For instance, in year 2010 the plan of table 14 an 
ticipates adjusting 597 cases while that of table 6 only pro 
jected 343. By year 2014, this pessimistic retention function 
produces twice as many, and by 2023 three times as many, 
cases to adjust; annual adjustment costs in those years vary 
proportionally as well.
Figure 2 shows the average number of cases to be adjusted 
in each future year according to these alternative retention 
functions. The elimination of the shift in the retention rate 
20 years after the injury is quite obvious. The pessimistic 
retention function yields an average duration of disability 
for cases that enter adjustment status (i.e., have a minimum 
duration of two years) of 17.5 years. This compares to the 
average duration of 15.2 years for the standard retention 
function introduced in chapter 2.
Table 14 reveals that the more substantial tail on the dura 
tion distribution has a marked effect on the forward funding 
level. All other parameters are the same as in table 6, but 
$103.3 million is required to prefund the plan under the in 
fluence of this pessimistic retention function. This funding 
level is $20.6 million or nearly 25 percent greater than that of 
the basic plan presented in table 6. The major difference is 
that the annual adjustment costs continue to grow indefinite 
ly in table 14; they do not reach a peak and then decline as 
they did earlier. The case closure rate here is always less than 
the increase in the adjustment factor for still active cases. 
Thus, expenditures never level off but continue to grow 
throughout the 50 years of the simulation.
The realism of this simulation with a pessimistic retention 
function will be left to the reader to judge. It would be
Figure 2
















astonishing, however, if fully 10 percent of the 1978 injury 
cases active during 1980 were still active 48 years later, as in 
dicated under the retention function of table 14. The simula 
tion of table 14 seems a relatively safe upper bound on 
benefit adjustment costs for a 5 percent plan.
In contrast, table 15 presents the results of a benefit ad 
justment fund simulation with an "optimistic" retention 
function. In this instance, the case closure rate is assumed 
never to fall below 8 percent per year; thus the retention rate 
rises to 92 percent in year four and remains constant 
thereafter. The result is a "thinner" tail to the case duration 
distribution. In year 2010 the optimistic retention function 
hypothesizes that only 197 cases will be active from the 1978 
cohort whereas table 6 showed 343. By the end of the 50-year 
simulation, 44 cases remain active as opposed to 77 in the 
earlier simulation. Again, figure 2 gives a graphical 
demonstration of the results of this change in retention func 
tion specification. The average duration of disability with 
the optimistic retention function declines to 12.2 years.
The optimistic retention function produces annual costs of 
adjustment that peak at less than $5.7 million in 1998 and 
then decline slowly. Again, it is important to reiterate that 
only the retention function is altered from the 5 percent an 
nual adjustment plan presented in table 6. With this op 
timistic retention function, the prefunding level required for 
the 5 percent plan is $57.9 million, or 30 percent less than for 
table 6. This can be regarded as a lower bound estimate for 
the 5 percent plan, holding other parameters constant.
Thus, the forward funding level of a benefit adjustment 
plan is revealed to be very sensitive to the specific shape of 
the retention function. This reflects the very large adjust 
ment factors to be paid far in the future, which make each 
additional case very expensive. In comparison to the stan 
dard 5 percent adjustment plan of table 6 which required an
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assessment rate of nearly 25 percent, the pessimistic reten 
tion function requires nearly 31 percent and the optimistic 
retention function 17 percent of 1978 indemnity payments to 
prefund lifetime benefit adjustment payments for the 1978 
injury cohort. This range of variation is not unlike that 
shown in table 12 for sensitivity to the inflation parameters.
This analysis could also be interpreted as measuring the 
sensitivity of the prefunding requirement to utilization 
levels. Suppose the original retention function correctly 
describes the current duration distribution among workers© 
compensation cases in Michigan. Then the pessimistic reten 
tion function could be thought of as the emerging pattern if 
the existence of a benefit adjustment fund serves to reduce 
the likelihood of closure among the long term disability 
cases. In these terms, the sensitivity analysis of the retention 
function is somewhat reassuring. When the extreme long 
term closure rate was cut in half (from 8 percent to 4 percent 
annually), the forward funding level increased by about one- 
fourth (from $82.7 million to $103.3 million). This is a very 
significant change, but it does not suggest an unstable 
response to the number of cases to be adjusted in the distant 
future.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to leave the discussion of 
the retention function without a final caution. The retention 
function is the critical behavioral component of the cost 
model employed here. But it was constructed from very 
sparse empirical evidence and its validity is essentially 
untested. This is particularly critical for the extremely long 
durations. These have not even been observed yet in 
Michigan due to the limited time since lifetime benefits were 
established. The sensitivity analysis presented here has prob 
ed this area, but it is not an adequate substitute for actual ex 
perience. If a benefit adjustment fund is to be implemented, 
a very high priority must be placed on a data system that will
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generate sufficient case duration information, both to track 
what is happening currently and to improve the prediction of 
what will develop in the future.
The conclusions of this sensitivity analysis would appear 
to be threefold. First, it appears that a benefit adjustment 
fund for one cohort of workers© compensation beneficiaries 
in Michigan can be adequately prefunded, including some 
provision for unforeseen contingencies, with an assessment 
level of about 30 to 33 percent of base year indemnity 
payments. Such an assessment on the example 1978 injury 
cohort would yield between $100 million and $110 million. 
This would amount to a benefit cost increase of between 22 
and 25 percent of the $335 million in total 1978 indemnity 
payments for the Michigan workers© compensation system. 
The insured sector©s share of this amount, some $60 to $66 
million, would constitute a cost increase of 7.5 to 8.2 percent 
of the Standard Earned Premium for 1978.
Second, the single cohort forward funding level is very 
sensitive to the annual adjustment factor, the interest earn 
ings rate, and the number of cases to be adjusted. These are 
the major ways in which actual future developments will im 
pinge on the fund, and policy control of these parameters is 
not possible. However, while the funding level is sensitive to 
these elements, it is not unstable or explosive in response. It 
appears to change in a relatively smooth and predictable 
manner with changes in these parameters.
Third, there will inevitably be some level of risk associated 
with establishing a prefunded benefit adjustment plan. It is 
not possible to foresee the costs of such an operation with 
perfect clarity. Thus, the choice of an assessment level will 
carry with it an unspecified probability of insufficiency. The 
data system that would be needed to accompany the fund 
will make possible the detection of the insufficiency. The 
commingling of funds from different cohorts, discussed in
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the last chapter, combined with the regularity of fund 
response that emerges from the sensitivity analysis, will 
make possible the adaptation to any insufficiency. But the 
risk of insufficiency cannot be avoided at reasonable assess 
ment levels when prefunding lifetime benefit adjustment 
payments for a single injury cohort.
In the next chapter a number of possible modifications in 
the plan are considered, all of which would have the effect of 
reducing the current cost of benefit adjustment. None of 
them can fundamentally alter the necessity to face the uncer 
tainties inherent in this situation, however.
CHAPTER 5
Reducing the Cost 
of Benefit Adjustment
Based on the experience of the Workers© Compensation 
Reform Task Force in Michigan, the major impediment to 
implementing an inflation adjustment plan is clearly the 
cost. As we have seen here, the estimated cost of such a pro 
gram is quite high. But there is also the fear that even these 
estimates will prove too low due to increased utilization, 
future inflation rates, or whatever.
The sensitivity analysis of the last chapter examined the 
way in which the forward funding level varies with the 
critical parameters of benefit adjustment that will be impos 
ed by the outside world. Knowledge of the potential impact 
of future developments is one sort of adaptation to the 
uncertainty that exists in this situation. But it is also worth 
looking at the specifics of the benefit adjustment plan itself 
to determine whether there are ways in which the uncertainty 
could be reduced or costs lowered. This will be done in the 
first part of the chapter.
Later on we will look at a current funding, or "pay-as- 
you-go," approach to benefit adjustment. Naturally, this 
would bring annual costs down dramatically in the near 
future; it would also produce huge unfunded liabilities, 
however. Last, growing out of the discussion of the current 
funding approach, an intermediate, adaptive strategy is
81
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reviewed. This would amount to a pay-as-you-go approach 
with fairly substantial reserves (far short of those in a 
prefunded plan, however). The adaptive element would 
derive from the middle term focus (10 to 20 years) of the 
plan©s management.
Fund Alternatives
There are a number of ways that a benefit adjustment plan 
could be made less expensive, even in the uncertain world in 
which it will operate. Obviously, this does not simply 
amount to choosing one of the "cheaper" states of the world 
that have been reviewed in the sensitivity analysis, but the 
same effects can be generated by manipulating the structure 
of the plan.
For instance, we saw in chapter 4 that the cost of a benefit 
adjustment plan depends rather heavily on the annual ad 
justment factors that will be paid. While it is not possible to 
affect the rate of increase in the state average weekly wage, it 
is possible to include only a fraction of this change in the ad 
justment factor. This could be done either through specify 
ing that the adjustment factor will be some particular frac 
tion, say two-thirds or three-fourths, of the increase in the 
state average weekly wage, or through the use of annual 
caps. That is, it could be specified that the adjustment factor 
will be the increase in the state average weekly wage but not 
to exceed 6 percent, or 8 percent, or some other number, per 
year.
To the extent that the cap would reduce the average annual 
adjustment factor over a period of years, the cost of the plan 
would be reduced correspondingly. This technique would 
also have the effect of reducing the uncertainty inherent in 
prefunding the plan, since there would be no question of the 
average adjustment factor exceeding the annual cap. It 
would give rise to some equity concerns, however. In times
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like the present when those still working are experiencing 
declining real incomes as average wage increases lag behind 
price increases, there would appear to be little justification 
beyond expediency for forcing the disabled to tighten their 
belts more than their former colleagues. However, the cost 
savings could be very significant (recall table 12 in chapter 4) 
and the use of annual caps on the adjustment factor would 
also have the effect of increasing the spread between the 
fund interest earnings rate and the annual adjustment factor, 
to the benefit of the financial health of the fund.
Another suggestion has been to impose a lifetime max 
imum adjusted benefit level of 200 percent of the original 
benefit. The simulation of this plan is presented in table 16. 
The cost side of this simulation is identical to that of table 6 
until the lifetime maximum is reached in 1994, some 16 years 
after the year of the injury. Then the average adjustment fac 
tor stops rising and adjustment costs decline with the number 
of cases. The projected assessment level necessary to prefund 
this plan for the 1978 injury cohort is $60.7 million, or an 
assessment rate of 18.1 percent on 1978 indemnity payments. 
This is a reduction of more than one-fourth from the assess 
ment level of table 6.
A plan with a maximum lifetime benefit is not necessarily 
very attractive as a permanent solution to the inflation pro 
tection needs of workers© compensation beneficiaries, but it 
does have a substantial cost impact. Given the vast uncer 
tainties of these future projections, perhaps the idea of a 
lifetime maximum would have some appeal as another adap 
tive technique. Using the best assumptions available about 
the future at the present time, we estimate the forward fund 
ing required for a benefit adjustment plan with a lifetime 
maximum. The assessment rate is determined, assessments 
collected, and the fund goes into operation. Now there are 
three major potential sources of variation in the actual fund 
performance. First, fund earnings may differ from projected
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levels. This would be particularly likely in early years (where 
it would have the greatest impact), assuming that interest 
rates and inflation rates would be declining over the next few 
years. Yet, if the annual adjustment factor was capped, the 
increase in fund earnings would not be entirely offset by 
greater adjustment payments. Thus the financial condition 
of the fund should improve, perhaps sufficiently to make 
possible a modification of the lifetime maximum.
Second, it is likely that the retention function will turn out 
to be too cautious and the magnitude of long term cases will 
be significantly lower than predicted. This, of course, would 
free funds for adjusting the cases that do remain active, 
possibly enabling a revocation of the lifetime maximum pro 
vision. Third, it may turn out that the plan will face a less in 
flationary world than anticipated. Hopefully, inflation rates 
will drop significantly, and the magnitude of the burden on 
the benefit adjustment fund will be reduced accordingly. 
Once again, this would free funds already collected that 
could be used for future adjustments above the lifetime max 
imum.
In the event that none of these things came to pass, it 
would still be many years before a claimant suffered any loss 
through the 200 percent lifetime maximum provision. Thus 
there would be time to anticipate this situation and make 
whatever provisions would be necessary to protect the in 
tegrity of the claimants© compensation benefits. We would 
also be in a far superior position to predict the actual costs 
after some years of operation of a benefit adjustment fund. 
The data would be better and we would have a better 
understanding of the behavioral changes induced by system 
changes. Thus a decision on revoking the lifetime maximum 
could be made in a less uncertain environment.
A definitional issue that would impact on the adjustment 
factor is the basis for figuring length of disability. One sug-
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gestion has been that continuous years of disability, with ap 
propriate provision for work experiments, would be the basis 
for qualifying and for calculating the adjustment factor for 
an individual case. Another suggestion has been that 
cumulative years of disability would be preferable. This issue 
has considerable importance in cases that show multiple 
spells of disablement stemming from a single accident or 
disease and in repeated trauma cases. Would the adjustment 
factor be calculated from the original injury date, the most 
recent injury date, or from the last day of work? What im 
pact would this have on the cost of adjustment?
In the active case tabulations underlying the simulations 
presented here, no actual measurement of duration of 
disability was made. Active cases were tabulated according 
to the injury date alone; this need not coincide with the date 
of onset of disability, of course. 1 Generally, this method 
should overestimate the actual duration of disability, but 
without more detailed study of durations it is not possible to 
determine the cost impact of various administrative defini 
tions of the date of injury or the duration of disability. 
However, it is clear that a method that results in shorter 
average durations will lower the cost of benefit adjustment.
Another way to reduce the cost of benefit adjustment 
would be to reduce the number of cases to be adjusted. This 
might be done through disqualifying certain groups of cases, 
partial disabilities for example. Under current law in 
Michigan, partial disability compensation cases are essential-
1. Michigan statute provides (Section 301(1)):
Time of injury or date of injury as used in this act in the case of a disease or in the 
case of an injury not attributable to a single event shall be the last day of work in the 
employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in 
disability or death.
Thus in many of the cases where there would be some question as to whether the date of in 
jury and date of disablement are the same, the statute already provides an "artificial" in 
jury date. This will reduce the impact of the issues raised here, but not eliminate them en 
tirely.
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ly self-liquidating. Since the basis of compensation is two- 
thirds of the difference between the pre-injury earnings and 
current earnings, it does not take long for the inflationary 
rise in current earnings to eliminate the basis for indemnity 
payments. But if these cases are not characterized by total 
dependence on the income maintenance element of workers© 
compensation, perhaps an argument could be made for a flat 
exclusion from benefit adjustment. Similar thoughts have 
been expressed in Michigan with regard to scheduled losses.
In a more positive vein, the number of cases to be adjusted 
could also be reduced by more aggressive rehabilitation ef 
forts. In a larger policy context, this could be regarded as an 
important social benefit. Full lifetime benefit adjustment 
will make long duration cases significantly more expensive 
and raise the direct economic payoff to rehabilitation. In 
creased rehabilitative efforts can in turn be expected to 
reduce the number of cases requiring benefit adjustment.
The expense of benefit adjustment can also be affected by 
the waiting period before adjustment begins. In all simula 
tions presented heretofore, benefit adjustment began on the 
second anniversary of the injury. But if it was determined 
that this plan is simply too expensive, one adaptation that 
could be made would be to increase the waiting period. Table 
17 shows the results of a simulation on the 1978 injury 
cohort of a benefit adjustment plan with a three-year waiting 
period. All other parameters are the same as in table 6.
The forward funding level for this plan is $72.4 million, 
about 12.5 percent less than for table 6. Adjustment costs are 
lower in every year because claimants are credited with one 
less year of longevity at each point in the 50-year simulation. 
Interest earnings are higher due to the additional year "head 
start" relative to adjustment costs. A reduction of one- 
eighth in funding level is very significant, but the paltry ad 
justment factor of 5 percent after three full years must be
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Waiting period: 3 years
Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 5 percent compound
Interest earnings: 7 percent of average balance
Administrative costs: 8 percent of payout
FORWARD FUNDING REQUIRED: $72,400,000
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weighed against this. This factor could be mitigated by a 
"catch-up" adjustment factor that would pick up a larger 
share of the change in the state average weekly wage since the 
injury, perhaps all of it, but then the cost savings would be 
slashed also.
Roughly speaking, the 12.5 percent savings over table 6 
can be broken down into the additional 7 percent interest 
earnings and the 5 percent lower payments resulting from the 
extra waiting year. Restoring the 5 percent to the adjustment 
factor would reduce the cost savings correspondingly; then 
the only gain would be from the extra year of interest earned 
before adjustment payments begin. Whether it is worth it to 
make the claimants wait another year for their adjustments 
will be left to others to decide.
There is another more complicated possibility, first sug 
gested by State Senator David Plawecki (D-Dearborn 
Heights). Senator Plawecki proposed that benefits be ad 
justed annually according to the rise in the state average 
weekly wage (with a 6 percent annual cap), but that insurers 
carry responsibility for the first five years of adjustment 
payments. An assessment similar to that described earlier 
would be levied against indemnity payments in each year, 
but now the benefit adjustment fund would operate with a 
five-year waiting period. Thus there would be five full years 
of interest earnings before adjustment payments begin, yet 
claimants would be protected from inflation during the in 
terim.
Table 18 presents a simulation of this plan using a 5 per 
cent adjustment factor for the 1978 injury cohort. Under the 
same procedures discussed earlier, it would be necessary to 
raise $64.1 million or 19.1 percent of 1978 indemnity, to pre- 
fund this plan. This is a reduction of $18.6 million (more 
than 22 percent) from the comparable plan in table 6. Exact 
ly the same adjustment payments are being made, so after 50
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Waiting period: 5 years (Insurer pays earlier supplements)
Payments begin: Anniversary date
Annual adjustment rate: 5 percent compound
Interest earnings: 7 percent of average balance
Administrative costs: 8 percent of payout
FORWARD FUNDING REQUIRED: $64,100,000
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years have passed the total adjustment costs paid by the fund 
and the insurers will be identical to those in the plan 
represented by table 6. But the adjustment costs to be incur 
red by insurers do not appear in table 18. Still, this could be 
an attractive compromise funding alternative.
After the two-year waiting period, insurers will begin ad 
justing weekly compensation benefits. Under the simulation 
of table 18, they will advance the compensation rates of ac 
tive cases by 5 percent on the second, third, and fourth an 
niversaries of the injury. These three years of adjustment will 
be built into the compensation structure and will be a perma 
nent insurer obligation. Additional adjustments on this base 
would be the responsibility of the benefit adjustment fund, 
beginning on the fifth anniversary of the injury.
The insurer©s burden can be determined by subtracting the 
cost of adjustment for each year in table 18 from the cor 
responding annual cost in table 6. On the basis of the 1978 
injury cohort simulations, insurers would be liable for 
benefit adjustment payments totaling one-half million 
dollars in 1980, $1.3 million in 1981, $1.9 million in 1982, 
$2.1 million in 1983 and declining amounts thereafter as the 
number of cases declines with the retention function.
The effect of this pattern of adjustment would be to in 
crease insurers© income maintenance benefit payments to 
1978 cohort cases by 15.8 percent in each year after 1982. 2 In 
exchange for this stream of payments insurers as a whole 
could reduce the 1978 benefit adjustment fund assessment by 
$18.6 million. In other words, for annual payments of $2.1 
million maximum, declining to less than one million dollars 
by year 2000, a substantial reduction in assessment level can 
be realized. What this amounts to, in fact, is placing a pro-
2. Of course this would be much less than a 15 percent increase in workers© compensation 
costs since it only involves cases with more than two years© disability and. does not involve 
medical payments at all.
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portion of the benefit adjustment burden on a "pay-as-you- 
go" basis. In the next section we will consider a benefit ad 
justment fund operated completely on a current funding 
basis.
While a number of the options considered here offer 
significant cost-saving potential, they mostly achieve this at 
the expense of some claimants. This does not necessarily 
make them unacceptable, since even a flawed benefit adjust 
ment plan is better than no plan at all from the claimants© 
point of view. However, the implementation decisions will 
be difficult ones since they will involve questions of equity 
among claimants.
For instance, assuming it was necessary to reduce costs, 
would it be better to increase the waiting period before 
benefit adjustment begins or to impose an annual cap on the 
adjustment factor? This is not an easy question to answer, 
particularly in advance of any experience with the benefit ad 
justment population. Perhaps it is best that these choices will 
be made in the legislative arena, since they must be made 
with imperfect information and will involve important equi 
ty issues. Let us go on to consider a current funding ap 
proach to benefit adjustment, apparently the "cheapest" 
and most controversial approach of all.
Current Funding Basis
Due to the difficulties of the Social Security system in the 
last few years, "pay-as-you-go" has acquired a relatively un 
savory connotation. 3 However, it is an option available to a 
public income maintenance program, and it certainly can 
reduce current payments in the short-run, although admit 
tedly this is at the expense of future unfunded liabilities.
3. See the excellent book by Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution), 1979 for an account of the reasons for these dif 
ficulties.
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While a current funded, or pay-as-you-go, strategy is 
regarded as unfair competition by the insurance industry 
since they cannot use this approach themselves, it still should 
be reviewed in the search for a viable inflation protection 
program. The Second Injury Fund and the other special 
funds in Michigan workers© compensation are now operating 
on a current funding basis, so the principle is not new. With 
careful design and prudent management of such a program, 
it may well be a viable strategy for an inflation protection 
plan for workers© compensation beneficiaries in Michigan 
and elsewhere.
The annual costs of a pay-as-you-go benefit adjustment 
program would be the same figures as were presented in the 
adjustment cost column of table 7 back in chapter 3 when the 
operation of the full fund was presented. They are repeated 
in table 19 together with the estimated number of cases that 
would be receiving adjustment payments in each year up to 
2028. To repeat, these projections are based on an assump 
tion of a 4 percent annual increase in the number of claims 
and a 5 percent increase in the average compensation rate. 
The retention function is applied to each cohort in exactly 
the way it was earlier. Thus, the number of cases to be ad 
justed changes each year in accord with the balance between 
the incoming cohort and the cumulative closure of older 
cases. Similarly, for the annual adjustment costs, the annual 
change is made up of the increase occasioned by the new 
cohort entering adjustment status, plus the additional year©s 
adjustment step to older cases, less the previous cost of ad 
justing cases that have closed during the year.
Under the static assumptions used for the simulations 
presented in this paper, the annual rate of increase in the 
number of cases in adjustment status will slowly approach 4 
percent as the case population matures through the 50-year 
time span. The annual rate of increase in adjustment costs 
will approach 9.2 percent, as this is the amount by which the
Table 19
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workers© compensation costs of each succeeding injury 
cohort exceeds the cost of the preceding one. After the very 
rapid early rise in the number of cases and the costs of ad 
justment, they both settle down to a steady rate of increase in 
accord with the assumptions. This result would apply 
precisely to an actual situation only if both the rate of in 
crease in the number of claims and the rate of increase in the 
average compensation rate were constant. This would of 
course be a very unusual world. However, the point to be 
made is that the costs are not explosive. As the case popula 
tion matures, the rate of increase in current funding levels re 
quired for benefit adjustment payments approaches the rate 
characterizing the underlying parameters of the workers© 
compensation case population.
This is demonstrated in table 20 which projects the cost of 
a current funded benefit adjustment program relative to the 
total indemnity base, i.e., the base against which the 
assessments would be levied. Starting from the actual total 
indemnity paid in 1978 of $334.8 million, each subsequent 
year is estimated to show an increase of 9.2 percent in total 
indemnity payments (in accord with assumptions presented 
in chapter 3). Then, as the annual rate of increase in pay-as- 
you-go benefit adjustment costs approaches the stable value 
of 9.2 percent, the relative cost stabilizes as well since both 
the required annual assessment amount and the assessment 
base are increasing at the same rate.
While this exercise is also artificial in being based on a 
steady state assumption, it does enable us to estimate the 
long-run relative cost level of a current funded benefit ad 
justment plan. The last column of table 20 represents the ap 
proximate assessment rate necessary to pay each year©s total 
benefit adjustment costs. Under the assumptions employed 
here, annual adjustment costs will eventually rise to just over 
16 percent of then current indemnity payments and hold 
there, so long as the underlying case dynamics remain the
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same. The comments of chapter 3 regarding the actual effec 
tive cost level apply here as well. Sixteen percent of current 
indemnity would constitute a lesser percentage of current 
benefit costs, and a still lesser percentage of workers© com 
pensation insurance premium costs. These cost levels are also 
not including any interaction with other workers© compensa 
tion provisions, and do not allow for increased utilization.
There are vast unfunded liabilities inherent in this pay-as- 
you-go approach, of course. But this would not necessarily 
be grounds for dismissing the idea out of hand, especially if 
there is good reason to believe that the relationship between 
the revenue base and the cost burden is stable, and will re 
main so. In the benefit adjustment situation, this would in 
volve the relationship between the indemnity paid in any par 
ticular year and the cumulative benefit adjustment costs for 
all previous injury cohorts as represented in table 20.
But table 20 simply demonstrated that // this relationship 
were constant, the assessment level would approach a stable 
value in the long-run. Thus it dealt only with the question of 
stability of assessment as the case population matured, not 
with variations in the underlying relationship between cur 
rent indemnity payments and current benefit adjustment 
costs. To deal with this issue it is necessary to return to the 
benefit adjustment model.
Recalling the notation of the benefit adjustment model 
presented in chapter 2, the year j costs of a pay-as-you-go 
plan would be:
j-w j-w
Sj = m 2 fijCij = 2 fij(Aipij) (cijdij) 
i=l i=l
In this model i represents the injury year, j the current year, 
w the waiting period before benefit adjustment begins, fy the 
specific adjustment factor for each injury cohort in year j, Aj 
the number of weekly benefit cases in injury year i, pjj the
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proportion of the Aj cases still active in year j, qj the average 
weekly compensation rate in year j for cases from injury year 
i, and dy the average weeks duration in year j for cases from 
injury year i. The year j assessment base could be represented 
as:
j-l 
Bj = Aj (cjdj)+ 2
where Rj represents the dollar amount of redemption 
payments in year j, and weekly compensation payments to 
year j injury cases have been removed from the summation.
But note that the middle term in this expression is nothing 
but the year j cost of active claims from earlier years, in 
other words, the cases which are eligible for benefit adjust 
ment. In fact, if the waiting period for benefit adjustment 
was one year, this would represent perfectly the basic com 
pensation payments in year j which are the object of benefit 
adjustment:
M M
When we multiply each cohort©s compensation by its benefit 
adjustment factor, we obtain the year j costs of benefit ad 
justment:
j-l
But this means that this term appears in both the assessment 
base and the adjustment cost expressions. Since it is a com 
ponent part of both quantities, variation in Cy will not 
destabilize the relationship between them. It will in fact be a 
strong stabilizing influence, with the extent of this influence 
determined by the proportion of all indemnity payments in a 
given year which are paid to cases from previous injury 
years.
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So the threat to cost stability for a pay-as-you-go opera 
tion lies in the relationship between the current year 
payments to new cases (including redemptions) and the con 
tinuing payments to old cases. Expansion in total first year 
workers© compensation indemnity payments from one injury 
cohort to the next will tend to reduce the cost burden of 
benefit adjustment slightly. Each new cohort would make a 
larger immediate impact on revenues than the new adjust 
ment cohort will make on benefit adjustment costs.
But if first year indemnity were to decline, the twist would 
be reversed and the cost of pay-as-you-go benefit adjustment 
would rise relative to the assessment base. That would 
necessitate a higher assessment rate. This effect will be 
limited since, naturally, a less expensive cohort for assess 
ment will soon translate into a less expensive cohort to ad 
just. But if workers© compensation costs were to reverse their 
historical escalation, it would make pay-as-you-go somewhat 
more expensive due to the differential impact on the assess 
ment base and the benefit adjustment costs. This has the very 
unfavorable implication that if the incidence of disabling ac 
cidents could be reduced in the future, the rise in the relative 
cost of benefit adjustment for old cases would absorb some 
of the savings.
In chapter 3 we encountered another potential problem 
when it was pointed out that redemption settlements would 
contribute to the assessment base but not to any future cost 
burden on a benefit adjustment fund. It is clear that a chang 
ing incidence of redemptions would be destabilizing to a pay- 
as-you-go benefit adjustment fund. Fewer redemptions 
would clearly reduce the assessment base (Bp directly; but if 
these claims enter weekly payment status instead, they would 
also increase the adjustment cost burden in future years. An 
increasing incidence of redemption settlements would of 
course reduce the relative cost of pay-as-you-go benefit ad 
justment through the same mechanisms. Thus redemptions
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would constitute a considerable potential destabilization 
threat to a pay-as-you-go benefit adjustment plan. It is not 
entirely clear whether the imposition of an inflation adjusted 
workers© compensation benefit would change the likelihood 
of a redemption settlement in a particular case. However, it 
is possible that it would. Thus the threat must be taken 
seriously.
Finally, the influence of the retention function must be 
considered. Since it is the model©s determinant of the 
number of disability cases that will be adjusted in the future, 
it is again revealed to be the critical behavioral component. It 
is at the heart of the relationship between payments to new 
cases and payments to old cases. Clearly, a change in the 
average duration of disability cases would be seriously 
destabilizing to a current funded benefit adjustment opera 
tion, just as it would be to a prefunded plan. There is no par 
ticular reason why this should be more troublesome in a pay- 
as-you-go funding plan, however.
In fact, a current funded benefit adjustment plan could 
tolerate a higher level of uncertainty about the underlying 
case population parameters, since it would not be necessary 
to precisely delineate lifetime payments to one cohort in ad 
vance. Thus the fund could make maximum use of actual 
benefit adjustment experience as it unfolds. It is clear from 
table 20 that there would be plenty of time for adjustment to 
future expenditure levels as it becomes possible to forecast 
them with greater accuracy than is possible at the present 
time.
It would also be possible to structure a pay-as-you-go in 
flation adjustment program that would generate substantial 
reserves in the near term, but converge to a current funding 
approach at some later date. Suppose, for example, that a 
program was established with a 10 percent assessment rate 
against base year indemnity payments. Given the simulation
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results presented here, it would appear that this would be on 
ly about 40 percent of the required level for prefunding a 5 
percent adjustment program. Yet table 21 shows that such an 
annual assessment level would be sufficient to cover annual 
adjustment costs for all cohorts (under the assumptions 
stated earlier) through 1994, or the first 16 years of operation 
of the fund. Further, substantial reserves would have been 
generated (approaching $1 billion), so that interest earnings 
would generate sufficient revenues to pay roughly half the 
annual adjustment costs at that time.
While this program would not be viable indefinitely under 
the assumptions supporting table 21 (the year-end balance 
begins to decline after year 2000), it would provide a reser 
voir of experience with which to set future assessment levels 
to provide for the continuance of the program in similar cir 
cumstances into the future. Since table 20 indicated that 
under the stated assumptions pay-as-you-go costs will even 
tually approach 16 percent of current indemnity, a gradual 
advance to that assessment level could be preprogrammed.
However, given the considerable uncertainties, it would 
seem preferable to choose an adaptive strategy that would 
allow accumulating experience to determine the assessment 
rates in the future. Legislation could provide for review of 
the status of the fund on a periodic basis and could also set 
targets or requirements for the level of reserves relative to 
annual expenditures. At any rate, the results of tables 20 and 
21 help to show how much room for adaptability is available 
in this situation, provided adjustment is made well in ad 
vance of current requirements. If the administrators keep 
their gaze fixed 10 to 20 years in the future, adaptation to 
emerging inflation adjustment experience should be possible 
without wildly fluctuating assessment levels.
The problem is that this begins to sound like the "blank 
check" operation that employer interests resist so strongly.
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However, there is no reason why a maximum assessment rate 
could not be written into the statute, together with provi 
sions for dealing with any shortfalls that may develop subse 
quently. As discussed in chapter 3, a shortfall could be met 
either with the addition of public money or with some prora- 
tioning of benefits among existing beneficiaries.
Under such a current funding strategy, there is really not 
that much difference in practice from a prefunded benefit 
adjustment operation. It is in the nature of the contractual 
arrangements that a public fund will assign responsibility for 
some or all of the risk of a shortfall to employers, while 
private insurance carriers cannot. But it should not escape 
mention that the quid pro quo for this greater risk of future 
cost increases is lower present costs. Whether it is worth the 
trade must be debated in the legislative arena. Suffice it to 
say that a current funded benefit adjustment program for 





We have examined in some detail the option of a state 
benefit adjustment fund to protect Michigan workers© com 
pensation beneficiaries from the ravages of inflation. Such a 
fund would raise the required revenues through an assess 
ment on total indemnity payments in each year. The pro 
ceeds would be invested by the fund administrators until 
needed to reimburse insurers for inflation supplements that 
would be added to weekly workers© compensation benefit 
checks. The underlying theme of this discussion has been 
uncertainty, and it is the subject of uncertainty that must 
dominate these conclusions as well.
A conceptual model was developed to help represent the 
factors that would determine the costs of benefit adjustment 
for the workers© compensation cases originating in one in 
jury year (one injury cohort). The key behavioral component 
of this model was the retention function, a dynamic 
representation of the distribution of disability durations 
among workers© compensation cases. The retention function 
represented this distribution by the probability of retention 
(its complement is the probability of closure) of cases from 
one injury cohort through each of the 50 years following the 
injury year.
Due to the fact that unlimited duration disability benefits 
were only extended to general disability cases in Michigan in 
1965, it is clear that 50 years of experience have not yet been
105
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accumulated. In fact, at the time of observation of the data 
base available for this study, only 13 years experience had ac 
cumulated. Thus the first level of uncertainty in the conclu 
sions must be the uncertainty over the theoretical representa 
tion of the future duration experience for workers© compen 
sation cases.
Beyond a dozen years, the retention function is based on 
hypothesis rather than demonstrated empirical facts. Thus 
there is uncertainty about how many cases will qualify for 
benefit adjustment payments in future years. While waiting 
for the accumulation of more data would help resolve the 
uncertainty, it would also delay the implementation of a pro 
gram to protect claimants from inflation. We attempted to 
deal with this uncertainty in chapter 4 by substituting more 
pessimistic and optimistic hypothetical retention functions 
for the standard one presented in chapter 2. This analysis 
revealed substantial, though not ruinous, sensitivity to the 
specification of the retention function. Yet in the final 
analysis, the only advance test of the retention function is the 
test of reasonableness. It is submitted to the reader for this 
test.
There is a second level of uncertainty closely related in 
practical terms, though not in conceptual terms, to the first. 
The empirical base of the work presented here lies ir 
revocably in the current workers© compensation system. It is 
not possible to predict the behavioral response of claimants 
or insurers to the imposition of a benefit adjustment pro 
gram. There are two major ways in which such responses 
could endanger the conclusions of this study. First, it is 
possible that the addition of inflation protection could alter 
the observed durations of disability. This might occur 
through a straight incentive effect (on either side) or, 
perhaps, through encouraging a more aggressive rehabilita 
tion effort or some other indirect means.
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Second, it has been pointed out that the incidence of 
redemption (compromise and release) settlements might be 
influenced by the addition of inflation protection to the in 
come maintenance benefits in workers© compensation. The 
rationalist argument suggests that both parties to the com 
promise (the insurer and the claimant) should be able to 
estimate the present value of the expected future stream of 
benefits, whether adjusted for inflation or not. Thus while 
the dollar amount of the average redemption would likely 
change, there would be no reason to expect the proportion of 
cases redeemed to change as a result of the addition of infla 
tion protection. However, it is also possible that the deci 
sions to compromise are not made on a rational expectations 
basis, and thus the possibility of reaction is very real.
It was demonstrated earlier that an increasing incidence of 
redemptions relative to weekly benefit cases would result in a 
financial advantage for a benefit adjustment fund. This is 
true because the dollars paid in redemptions enter the assess 
ment base, but do not give rise to an associated long term 
claim for benefit adjustment. On the other hand, if the addi 
tion of inflation protection makes claimants significantly less 
likely to accept redemption settlements, this will raise the 
benefit adjustment cost burden while at the same time reduc 
ing the injury year assessment base. In chapter 5 this was 
cited as a significant destabilizing threat for a current funded 
strategy, but the same problem exists in a prefunded ap 
proach.
The last level of uncertainty to be dealt with is the uncer 
tainty over the future developments that will condition both 
the costs and the revenues of a benefit adjustment fund. We 
cannot know in advance what inflation rates will be for the 
next five years, much less the next 50 years. Thus we cannot 
estimate accurately the annual adjustment factors or interest 
earnings rates that will be encountered. But with a forward 
funding approach, it is necessary to raise sufficient revenues
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this year to guarantee inflation protection for the lifetime of 
the youngest claimant in this year©s injury cohort.
In chapter 4 this uncertainty problem was attacked with a 
range of assumed values for these critical parameters. We ex 
amined average annual inflation adjustment factors from 4 
to 8 percent, and interest earnings rates on fund balances 
from 6 to 10 percent, in an attempt to bracket the actual 
values that could be expected. It was also shown in chapter 4 
that it is the relationship between these two future 
parameters as well as their absolute values that will influence 
the performance of the benefit adjustment fund. This is clear 
from the fact that paying higher adjustment factors hurts, 
but earning higher interest rates helps the fund. Since these 
two inflation parameters tend to move together, the poten 
tial impact of each is somewhat mitigated. Nevertheless, a 
substantial level of uncertainty remains about the way in 
which future states of the world will impact a benefit adjust 
ment fund for workers© compensation beneficiaries.
All three of these types of uncertainty (uncertainty over 
whether we have represented the current workers© compensa 
tion experience adequately, uncertainty over whether the 
current workers© compensation experience will be an ade 
quate guide in the future, and uncertainty over future states 
of the world within which the workers© compensation system 
will operate) lead to the same conclusion, fears about the 
sufficiency of the assessment level for a forward funded in 
flation protection program.
These fears cannot be allayed at a reasonable cost level. In 
the sensitivity analysis it was shown that under favorable 
assumptions about future inflation rates, a lifetime benefit 
adjustment program for the 1978 injury cohort could be pro 
vided for about $60 million. With unfavorable assumptions 
(i.e., higher inflation rates), the same program would cost 
over $125 million. But there is no guarantee that even $125
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million will be sufficient. It clearly is more likely to suffice 
than a lesser number, but there is still a significant chance of 
shortfall.
It was concluded in chapter 4 that a benefit adjustment 
program for one Michigan injury cohort could be adequately 
prefunded with an assessment of 30 to 33 percent of base 
year (injury year) indemnity payments. As pointed out at 
that time, this would amount to an annual benefit cost in 
crease of 22 to 25 percent, although the insured sector©s 
share would only constitute about an 8 percent addition to 
the workers© compensation insurance bill.
But this conclusion from the simulation analyses really 
amounts to a judgment about the various factors producing 
the levels of uncertainty discussed previously. Concluding 
that a 30 percent assessment will be sufficient is a result of: 
(1) accepting 6 to 7 percent as a reasonable estimate of 
average inflation rates over the next 50 years; (2) judging 2 
percent to be an adequate estimate of future real interest 
rates; (3) accepting the standard retention function as suffi 
ciently conservative that it does allow for some increases in 
utilization as a result of the introduction of benefit adjust 
ment; (4) assuming that the proportion of redemptions will 
not change materially; and (5) ignoring potential complica 
tions like the savings in current differential benefit 
payments, possible savings from benefit coordination, 
changes in the definition of disability, or other statutory 
changes that might be introduced. 1
A 33 percent assessment rate clearly would allow more 
margin for error; roughly 1 percent more in the average an 
nual inflation rate, or half a percent less in the real interest 
rate, or a greater increase in utilization, etc. If all future 
developments were negative, the 33 percent assessment
1. See the section called "Evaluation of Estimate" in chapter 3 for the discussion of these 
factors.
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would apparently not be sufficient to make lifetime inflation 
adjustment payments unless some corrective action were 
taken, such as capping the annual or lifetime adjustment fac 
tors, disqualifying some claimants, etc.
Finally, all of this assumes that the current Michigan 
workers© compensation system is adequately represented in 
the model developed here, specifically that the case duration 
experience is accurately summarized by the retention func 
tion presented earlier. In the face of such overwhelming 
uncertainty, one is reduced to carefully examining the set of 
assumptions underlying a given cost estimate and reacting to 
the reasonableness of those assumptions. But it is important 
to recognize that if the future takes a radically different 
course, those same assumptions may not look very 
reasonable in hindsight.
For this reason, it is imperative that a benefit adjustment 
program include arrangements for detecting and adjusting to 
shortfalls or, more happily, to surpluses in the assessment 
levels. In other words, there must be a plan for adapting the 
fund to the actual benefit adjustment experience as it un 
folds. As mentioned in chapter 3, an adequate data system 
will be vital to tracking the benefit adjustment costs for each 
injury cohort in future years. This will make it possible to 
detect an impending shortfall or surplus while there is still 
time to adjust.
Assuming strict segregation of funds for different cohorts 
is maintained, adjustment to errors in assessment levels 
would be difficult but not impossible. If a supplemental 
assessment strategy were followed, it would be necessary to 
deal with the effect of mergers, bankruptcies, and other 
evolutionary changes in the employer population. The prob 
lems would certainly be much more tractable than those 
associated with retrospective inflation adjustment since 
records would be available from each assessment year and it
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would be much easier to reconstruct the assessment base. 
Presumably, the contractual problems between carriers and 
employers inherent in retrospective adjustment would also 
not arise since the benefit adjustment obligation would be 
imposed on the employer directly through the assessment. 
The carriers would only act as delivery agents for the infla 
tion supplements.
How easy it will be to actually levy a supplementary assess 
ment (retroactive assessment, in essence) remains to be seen. 
Clearly, there is considerable resistance to "reopening the 
books" on an old injury cohort, although in the case of 
refunding a surplus this would probably cause no difficulty. 
It was also pointed out earlier that it would be possible to 
make the adjustment to a shortfall through the injection of 
public funds if that is deemed preferable.
But considering the extended time horizons dictated by the 
obligation of lifetime inflation protection payments, and the 
very large reserves that would result from current funding of 
those obligations, perhaps the adjustment potential offered 
by implicit inter-cohort borrowing would be the preferred 
strategy for dealing with the uncertainties inherent in the 
benefit adjustment problem.
In chapter 3 it was suggested that the assessment rate be set 
at the level judged adequate to prefund lifetime benefit ad 
justment payments to one cohort. Then, as time progresses 
and future uncertainties become past realities, a periodic 
review of the sufficiency of each cohort©s assessment would 
be conducted. In the event that either surpluses or shortfalls 
predominate, future assessment rates could be adjusted ac 
cordingly. Thus while assessments from different years 
would be commingled, the determination of the adequacy of 
fund reserves would derive from separate projections of 
benefit adjustment costs for each cohort. This individual 
cohort measurement is important because the simulation of a
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full fund operation in chapter 3 shows that fund balances 
can be expected to grow indefinitely with a prefunding 
strategy. Therefore, total fund balances cannot provide an 
accurate guide to the financial health of a forward funded 
benefit adjustment plan.
It is likely that this breach of the pure forward funding 
principle will cause some to oppose it on principle. It will 
cause others to rush to the opposite extreme of a pay-as-you- 
go benefit adjustment plan. For that reason, a pay-as-you-go 
strategy was also simulated in chapter 5. Under the standard 
assumptions of this study, it was determined that a current 
funded benefit adjustment plan would gradually rise in cost 
to just over 16 percent of annual indemnity costs as the case 
population receiving inflation adjustment payments matured 
over the 50-year simulation period.
The danger in a pay-as-you-go funding strategy derives 
largely from the imperfect linkage between the cost burden 
and the revenue base, so an examination of the components 
of the annual assessment base was carried out using the sim 
ple benefit adjustment model developed here. It was 
discovered that there were grounds for concern, particularly 
as regards the proportion of redemptions in the Michigan 
workers© compensation system. If this proportion were to 
change substantially, it would have very considerable 
destabilization potential for a pay-as-you-go benefit adjust 
ment plan.
Thus it would seem prudent to consider at most a modified 
pay-as-you-go plan. This would involve setting an assess 
ment rate somewhere between that required to raise the an 
nual adjustment costs for all cohorts and the fully prefunded 
level discussed earlier. For the sake of illustration, an assess 
ment rate of 10 percent was considered in chapter 5. Under 
the standard assumptions of this study, such an assessment 
rate (about 40 percent of the full prefunded level) would pro 
vide a viable benefit adjustment fund for some 15 or 20
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years. That is to say, the annual payout does not overtake 
the annual assessment income until 16 years into the simula 
tion. The year-end balance would grow for over 20 years 
under the assumptions used here about the benefit adjust 
ment fund parameters.
Such a compromise strategy would allow the accumulation 
of a data base sufficient to narrow the range of uncertainty 
significantly from current levels, thereby making possible a 
more adequate determination of the costs of benefit adjust 
ment. It would of course accomplish this at the cost of the 
unfunded liabilities that will have been accrued in the in 
tervening years. Nevertheless, the conclusion was reached 
that this adaptive pay-as-you-go approach would be a viable 
option, provided the fund administrators kept their attention 
riveted 10 to 20 years in the future and did not overreact to 
immediate circumstances.
The following has been stated repeatedly throughout this 
paper, but it needs repetition one last time. This study does 
not provide a blueprint sufficient for construction of a 
benefit adjustment program. It is an attempt to provide a 
guide to some of the issues that must be settled, some of the 
hard choices that must be made, before such a program can 
be instituted. It is also an attempt to cope with the very great 
uncertainties that plague the exercise of looking into the 
future.
While the focus of the discussion has been largely on the 
problems of implementing a benefit adjustment program, 
this should not be taken as disapproval of the concept. If the 
uncertainties of inflation adjustment are very great, so is the 
need. To repeat the conclusion of the introductory chapter; 
the success of this effort will not be measured by the adop 
tion of a state benefit adjustment fund. Rather, it will lie in 
provoking the serious consideration of this and other options 
available to attack the problem of inflation protection for 
the long term disabled.

APPENDIX A
Projected Costs of Retrospective 
Inflation Adjustment
In order to estimate the future costs of retrospective infla 
tion protection proposals it is necessary to predict the 
number of cases from each injury cohort that will be active 
and eligible for adjustment at each year in the future. The 
data to make this kind of prediction possible are contained in 
the tabulation of active cases by injury year at the end of 
1977 and 1978, which were provided by the Bureau of 
Workers© Disability Compensation. These data are reported 
in table A-l, together with the year-to-year net retention 
rates that are implied by the differences between the two 
years© observations. The basic source of these data is the 
Form 103 "Annual Report on Payment of Compensation" 
that must be filed with the Bureau for every case being com 
pensated as of December 31. This should be an accurate 
measurement, but there may in fact be as much as a 15 per 
cent under-reporting of active cases. Since it is not known in 
what way this would bias the age distribution of the cases, it 
was not thought advisable to simply mark up each active 
cohort by 15 percent. Adjustment for this factor will be 
made later.
From table A-l it appears that the retention rates for ac 
tive cases are subject to a declining step function through 
time. Thus, among the 1977 injury cases active at the end of 
1977, about 40 percent are still active at the end of 1978. This 
is a net figure since it also includes cases active at the end of 
1978 that were not active one year earlier. In the absence of 
other information, we have assumed that among the cases 
from the current injury year that are still active at the end of 
the year, 60 percent will be closed during the following year.
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We can proceed similarly step by step to describe the per 
sistence of workers© compensation cases through time using 
the two observation points reported in table A-l.
Table A-l

































































SOURCE: Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation.
On the basis of the figures in table A-l, it is estimated that 
40 percent of the cases active at the end of the injury year are 
still active at the end of the next calendar year. Roughly 85 
percent of these remaining cases are still active at the end of 
the second full year following the injury year. Similarly for 
the third year, 85 percent remain active and 15 percent are 
closed for one reason or another. It also appears from table 
A-l that roughly 92 percent of the remaining cases are retain 
ed in each of the next two years, the fourth and fifth full 
years following the injury year. Thereafter, about 96 percent 
are retained from year to year; 4 percent are closed annually.
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After 20 years, it is hypothesized that the retention rate 
declines again to 92 percent as old age overtakes a larger and 
larger proportion of the injured workers.
This retention function can be applied to each injury 
cohort to estimate the number of workers© compensation 
cases that will be active at the start of each year subsequent 
to the injury year. This procedure can be applied to future 
cohorts as well after the size of the group is predicted 
through other means. For this exercise, the underlying 
workers© compensation weekly payment case population was 
projected to grow at a 10 percent compound annual rate. 
Table A-2 presents the projected active case population from 
each injury year cohort for each year up to 1983. This is the 
estimated case population which could be eligible for infla 
tion adjustment payments, depending on the specific 
parameters of the plan. It should be recalled that these 
estimates are subject to the possible under-reporting bias 
mentioned earlier, since all projections proceed from that 
data base.
It is also necessary to project the average weekly compen 
sation rate that will be paid to future injury cohorts so that 
the cost of a particular plan can be estimated. These 
estimates are also presented in table A-2. They were derived 
by projecting a 10 percent increase from 1978 to 1979 and a 
12 percent increase from 1979 to 1980. With the estimated 
number of cases to be adjusted from each injury cohort in 
each future year and an average compensation rate for each 
cohort, we need only apply the specific benefit adjustment 
plan to this data base to obtain the estimated cost of the plan 
in each future year.
Tables A-3, A-4, and A-5 show the unadjusted cost 
estimates for the Governor©s plan (appendix B) as submitted 
to the Workers© Compensation Reform Task Force. The 
unadjusted cost of this retrospective plan is projected at
Table A-2













































































































































































































































































 Projected to January 1, 1981.
Table A-4





































































































































*Projected to January 1, 1982.
Table A-5












































































































































*Projected to January 1, 1983.
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$24.1 million for calendar 1981. For 1982, the cost is ex 
pected to rise to $25.0 million. The increase is so small 
because the incoming 1979 cohort to be adjusted is partly 
offset by predicted closures of cases from other cohorts. 
Table A-5 shows the 1983 unadjusted costs to be $26.4 
million. Note that it is projected that in 1983 there will be 
nearly 20,000 cases to be adjusted; the incoming cohorts are 
larger than the annual closures so the active case population 
will continue to rise.
These unadjusted estimates must be qualified by some ma 
jor cost adjustments. The first is the possible under 
reporting of active cases that was mentioned earlier. If up to 
15 percent of active cases are not reported, they are missing 
from the data base and hence are not included in the cost 
estimates. It would seem likely that there would be a bias 
toward newer cases among those that go unreported since the 
routine of filing Form 103 may not have yet been establish 
ed. But assume the unreported cases are distributed across 
injury years exactly as the reported cases are. Then we will 
have underestimated the potential cost of inflation adjust 
ment by 15 percent.
On the other hand, some portion of the inflation adjust 
ment burden is already being handled. The Second Injury 
Fund pays inflation supplements (called differential benefits) 
to those individuals who are permanently and totally disabl 
ed as defined in Michigan statute. This is to ensure that these 
claimants get the same benefits they would be entitled to if 
they suffered their injury today. 1 Generally, the differential 
benefit would be greater than the benefit adjustment directed 
by the Governor©s proposal and thus no additional 
retrospective payment would be required. (See Section 352(6) 
of the Governor©s proposal.) This is particularly clear for 
cases dating from before 1965 since any cases still active
1. See Section 521(2) of the Michigan Workers© Disability Compensation Act.
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from injury years before 1965 must be permanent and total 
disabilities inasmuch as other types of cases were not granted 
lifetime benefits until September 1, 1965. Thus, if a 1964 
case is still being paid, it must be a permanent total disabili 
ty; otherwise the maximum term of 800 weeks of benefits 
which applied at that time would have already elapsed. In 
consequence, it is not necessary for the inflation adjustment 
plan under consideration to adjust these cases and they were 
simply excluded from all calculations as they were from the 
Governor©s proposal (See Section 352(1)).
But in addition to this group of cases, there will be the 
more recent permanent and total disabilities which may 
qualify for partial adjustment under Section 352(6). While it 
is impossible to accurately measure the savings in costs due 
to overlap of adjustment cases without a full survey of the 
current differential benefit population, indicative results are 
available from earlier cost estimations. When we compared 
the cost of adjusting known active cases on January 1, 1979 
with the cost of adjusting that population less the number of 
cases receiving differential benefits, it was discovered that a 
reduction of 7.6 percent was realized. This is therefore taken 
to represent the magnitude of the potential savings to a 
general retrospective inflation adjustment plan due to Sec 
ond Injury Fund differential benefit payments.
The last adjustment to be added derives from the exclusion 
of fatalities and partial disability cases from eligibility for in 
flation adjustment in the Governor©s proposal (See Section 
352(11)). There is no reliable source of data with which to 
estimate the cost savings that this provision would produce. 
However, sources familiar with the Michigan workers© com 
pensation system have estimated that between 5 and 10 per 
cent of active cases are partial disability or fatalities, with the 
bulk of this being fatalities. If these cases were excluded 
from eligibility, it could be anticipated that a savings of 
somewhat less than the number of cases would be realized.
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This would reflect the lower average compensation rate for 
partials and the lower average age of fatality cases due to the 
500-week benefit limitation.
Summing all three adjustments is a challenge. While they 
are all real, their exact magnitudes are unknown; they prob 
ably will never be known with reasonable certainty. Given 
this level of uncertainty, it is probably unwise to proceed to 
sum the adjustment factors and apply the results to tables 
A-3 through A-5. It would be unrealistic to pretend that sort 
of precision was available. Accordingly, we will just point 
out that these three factors will tend to be offsetting. If we 
have underestimated the basic costs of the plan by 10 to 15 
percent due to unreported cases, we have overestimated the 
costs by 10 to 15 percent due to the overlap with differential 
benefits and the inclusion of fatality and partial disability 
cases in our estimates. We will therefore let the unadjusted 
figures of tables A-3, A-4, and A-5 stand as the current best 
cost estimates pending additional data or experience.
By way of conclusion, it is only necessary to remind 
ourselves of the very great uncertainties inherent in these 
projections. We do not have sufficient information to pro 
ceed with confidence even in assessing known biases. Behind 
these lie all the interactions with other potential elements of a 
reform package such as offsets for pensions and Social 
Security benefits, changes in the definition of disability that 
would alter the differential benefit situation, and many 
others. Given all this, these estimates should be taken as in 
dicative of a general range of cost impact only, they do not 
constitute a blueprint for the future.
APPENDIX B
Governor's Proposal
Sec. 352. (1) Compensation rates otherwise payable under 
Section 351 shall be adjusted one time for any employee 
receiving or entitled to receive benefits whose date of injury 
is from September 1, 1965, through December 31, 1980. The 
percentage adjustment shall be computed using the total 
percentage changes (increase or decrease) in the average 
weekly wage in covered employment as used in Section 355, 
rounded to the nearest one-tenth of one percent. The adjust 
ment shall not exceed 5% of the original compensation rate 
for each calendar year included in the adjustment period. 
The adjustment period shall be a period of not less than two 
consecutive calendar years following the base year as outlin 
ed below, the adjustment to be effective on the January 1 
following the adjustment period. The percentage change 
shall be computed from the base year to the last year in the 
adjustment period. For injuries occurring from September 1, 
1965, through December 31, 1968, the base year shall be 
1968, and thereafter the base year will be the year in which 
the injury occurred. On January 1, 1981, rates will be ad 
justed as shown in Subsection (2) for any employee whose 
date of injury is from September 1, 1965, through December 
31, 1978. On January 1, 1982, rates shall be adjusted for any 
employee whose date of injury is from January 1, 1979, 
through December 31, 1979. On January 1, 1983, rates shall 
be adjusted for any employee whose date of injury is from 
January 1, 1980, through December 31, 1980.
(2) On January 1, 1981, a previously injured employee©s 
compensation rate shall be increased by the percentage 
shown, subject to the limitation in Subsection (7), for injury 
dates in the following periods. For the period from
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September 1, 1965, through December 31, 1968, rates shall 
be increased by 58.4%; for calendar year 1969 rates shall be 
increased by 53.4%; for calendar year 1970 rates shall be in 
creased by 48.4%; for calendar year 1971 rates shall be in 
creased by 44.6%; for calendar year 1972 rates shall be in 
creased by 39.6%; for calendar year 1973 rates shall be in 
creased by 34.6%; for calendar year 1974 rates shall be in 
creased by 29.6%; for calendar year 1975 rates shall be in 
creased by 25.0%; for calendar year 1976 rates shall be in 
creased by 20.0%; for calendar year 1977 rates shall increase 
by 15.0%; and for calendar year 1978 rates shall be increased 
by 10.0%.
(3) On December 1, 1981, the director shall announce the 
adjustment to be effective on January 1,1982, for employees 
whose date of injury occurred in calendar year 1979 using the 
formula in Subsection (1). On December 1, 1982, the direc 
tor shall announce the adjustment to be effective on January 
1, 1983, for employees whose date of injury occurred in 
calendar year 1980.
(4) The legislature may, after the third anniversary of this 
section and every third year thereafter, consider an addi 
tional adjustment of benefit levels for all injured or disabled 
employees receiving or entitled to receive benefits at that 
time.
(5) All claims found compensable subsequent to the adop 
tion of this section with an injury date preceding the effective 
date of this section shall be paid at the rate computed in ac 
cordance with this section.
(6) An employee eligible to receive differential benefits 
from the Second Injury Fund under Section 521 shall be paid 
the adjustment provided in this section as reduced by the 
amount of the differential payments being made to him or 
her by the Second Injury Fund at the time of adjustment.
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(7) The adjusted weekly compensation computed pursuant 
to this section shall not exceed the maximum weekly rate of 
compensation provided in Section 355 in effect on the date 
of adjustment.
(8) An employee shall not be entitled to benefits under this 
section for an injury for which liability has been redeemed.
(9) The adjustments provided in this section shall be paid 
by the carrier on a weekly basis. However, the carrier, the 
Second Injury Fund and the Self-insurers© Security Fund 
shall be entitled to reimbursement for these payments from 
the compensation adjustment fund created in Section 391.
(10) This section shall not become effective until the an 
nual appropriation required in Section 391 has in fact been 
appropriated by the legislature in sufficient amounts to meet 
the obligations of the fund created in Section 391, and if in 
any subsequent year funds are not appropriated by the 
legislature, benefits required by this section shall not be paid 
by carriers, the Second Injury Fund or the Self-insurers© 
Security Fund until such appropriation has in fact been 
made.
(11) This section shall not apply to anyone receiving week 
ly benefits under Sections 361(1) or 321.
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